















1LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS THAT JUSTIFY 
LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 






An evaluation of the different ways in which the South African legal system currently 
provides compensation for crime victims suggests that an alternative form of crime 
victim compensation should be considered. The most common solution adopted   in 
foreign jurisdictions is the enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation 
scheme. The crucial question is whether such legislative development could be 
justified in South Africa. To investigate the justifiability of a crime victim compensation 
scheme, the following approach is suggested. First, a theoretical framework must be 
developed to provide an outline for justifiable statutory reform of the law of delict 
insofar as the compensation of victims is generally concerned. Only once this has 
been done, can attention be given to the more specific question, namely whether 
the potential enactment of a statutory compensation fund for crime victims could fit 
into such a framework. This contribution focuses on the first issue, namely setting 
out a theoretical framework for future justifiable statutory development of the law  of 
delict. This is done by identifying legal and public policy considerations that the 
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legislature have used in the past to develop the law relating to the compensation  of 
specific categories of victims. This contribution therefore looks at the historical 
development of three major statutes that have developed the law relating to the 
compensation of specific categories of victims: the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 
1996, the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 
and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. 
Key words: Law of delict; crime victim compensation; statutory development of the law 




The way in which the South African legal system seeks to repair the harm suffered 
by crime victims has been described and evaluated elsewhere.1 In short, it was 
concluded that there are several theoretical and practical problems associated with 
crime victim compensation and that it was worthwhile to investigate alternatives. 
These difficulties may be summarised as follows: 
First, it should be emphasised that the likely indigence of South African criminals 
presents a significant obstacle to securing compensation through the institution of 
common-law delictual remedies against the perpetrator.2 As a result, those who have 
suffered harm arising from crime have had to adopt a different strategy.3 The recent 
past has seen these victims argue that it is the state, rather than the perpetrator of the 
crime, that should be held delictually liable for harm arising from crime.4 More 
specifically, they have argued that the state should be held vicariously liable in delict 
on the basis that its employees culpably and wrongfully caused the victim’s harm, 
either by action or inaction. This strategy has proven to be remarkably successful 
and has led to the significant expansion of the state’s liability for harm arising  from 
crime. 
 
1 See Wessels 2018: 31–127 for a description and evaluation of the current South African legal 
position regarding the compensation of harm suffered by crime victims. Attention is given to  the 
compensation of harm via common-law remedies in the law of delict, as well as the current 
statutory response to compensating crime victims. 
2 South African Law Reform Commission 2004: 74, 281–282. See, further, Wessels 2018: 15, 116–117, 
177–183, 212–214. 
3 See Wessels 2018: 37–105 for a detailed description of this strategy, as well as consequential 
expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising from crime. 
4 Indeed, an overview of the South African law reports provide remarkably few examples of 
instances where a crime victim instituted a delictual claim against the purported criminal to repair 
the harm he suffered. For example, in the following cases the victim instituted the condictio furtiva 
for theft of his property: Chetty v Italtile Ceramics Ltd 2013 (3) SA 374 (SCA); Crots     v Pretorius 
2010 (6) SA 512 (SCA); First National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v East Coast Design CC 2000 
(4) SA 137 (D); Clifford v Farinha 1988 (4) SA 315 (W). In the following cases the victim 
instituted a claim arising from violent crime: N v T 1994 (1) SA 862 (C); Mabaso v Felix 1981 (3) 
SA 865 (A); Schoultz v Potgieter 1972 (3) SA 371 (E); Manuel v Holland 1972 (4) SA 454 (R); 
Wessels v Pretorius, NO 1974 (3) SA 299 (NC); Mbatha v Van Staden 1982 (2) SA 260 (N); 
Groenewald v Groenewald 1998 (2) SA 1106 (SCA). However, most of the cases dealing with 







LEGAL AND PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
 
In this context, regard may be had to a report on the extent and impact of civil 
claims against the South African Police Services (SAPS). The report stated that, in 
recent years, the SAPS have “reported a substantial annual increase in civil claims 
filed for damages as a result of actions or omissions by its officials, and an even 
larger increase in claims pending. The 2014/2015 SAPS annual report showed that 
pending claims stood at over R26 billion, which is equivalent to over a third of    the 
SAPS budget”.5 The report alleges that between 2007/08 and 2014/15, “claims made 
annually against the SAPS increased by 533% if considering the original rand valued, 
or 313% if adjusted to the same rand value”.6 Lastly, it records that, in a parliamentary 
reply, the Minister of Police indicated that “just under R570 million had been spent 
by the SAPS on legal costs relating to civil claims between 2011/12 and 2013/14”.7 
This development presents theoretical and practical difficulties. Most 
significantly, on a practical level, it imposes a substantial financial burden on the state, 
which, in turn, threatens its overall ability to provide safety and security services and 
to prevent crime. This problem may be summarised in the following way: when the 
state employer is held vicariously liable for the culpable wrongdoing of an employee 
and is ordered to pay the crime victim’s damages, it is the taxpayer who ultimately 
has to bear the cost. However, if taxpayer money is used to pay compensation, then 
less money is available for performing the state’s ordinary tasks, namely, in the case 
of the police, preventing crime and promoting safety and security.8 Of course, this 
decreased ability to prevent crime only further serves to increase the likelihood of a 
higher crime rate and the accompanying litigation that may be instituted against the 
state on the basis that it failed to prevent crime. This means that the South African 
law of delict appears to be caught in a vicious circle of ever-expanding state delictual 
liability for harm arising from crime.9 
 
5 Dereymaeker 2015: 29. 
6 Idem at 31. 
7 Idem at 34. 
8 See, also, Wessels 2019: 8–10 for a discussion of the same problem within the context of harm 
arising from medical malpractice in the public healthcare sector. 
9 The extension of state delictual liability for harm arising from intentionally-committed crimes 
(through judgements in K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 (6) SA 419 (CC), as well as F v 
Minister of Safety and Security 2012 (1) SA 536 (CC)) have received particular criticism. Some 
of the theoretical concerns associated with this recent development include the following: First, it 
has been argued that future application of the reasoning in these judgements may produce arbitrary 
outcomes. This may produce legal uncertainty and lead to arbitrary conclusions being reached in 
similar cases. Secondly, these judgements interpreted each of the individual policemen’s actions 
involved in the crimes as simultaneously constituting both a positive, intentional delict, as well as 
a wrongful and negligent failure to comply with their legal duties to protect the victim from crime. 
This has apparently been done in an attempt to establish a sufficiently close connection between 
their employment and their wrongdoing for the sake of finding vicarious liability. However, this 
reasoning is not aligned with practical reality and may also lead to untenable outcomes from    an 
employer’s perspective. Also, the Constitutional Court’s appeal to the constitutional rights 
referred to in these cases ultimately cannot assist a court in determining whether certain conduct 









Furthermore, it has been pointed out that crime victims who want to institute 
common-law delictual claims directly against the state may likely face significant 
evidentiary difficulties in proving systemic negligence.10 This is particularly the case 
where the crime victim seeks to hold the state directly (as opposed to vicariously) 
liable. In addition, the assistance provided by the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
and the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 in relation to crime victim 
compensation is unsatisfactory.11 
Against that background, it was proposed that an alternative method should be 
investigated to provide compensation for crime victims. One particular alternative 
that has been adopted in various foreign jurisdictions is the establishment of a 
statutory compensation fund for crime victims.12 This would potentially amount to 
the statutory development of the law of delict, at least insofar as the compensation 
of crime victims is concerned. This presents a particular dilemma because, in this 
context, scholars, such as Atiyah and Cane, have raised their concern over the lack of 
a justifiable basis for this type of legislative intervention: “[T]he idea of selecting this 
group of injured and disabled people for special treatment is not easily defensible.”13 
Indeed, academics have consequently emphasised a “fundamental problem”14 that 
confronts reformers of the law of delict/tort law in this context, which is that “it is 
 
reliance on the role that trust played in establishing vicarious liability in these (and future) cases 
may be questioned on the basis that it allows for different outcomes being reached on similar facts. 
Lastly, the application of the vicarious liability doctrine in these cases undermine the balance that 
has traditionally been sought to achieve between the interests of the employer, employee and 
victim. Instead, the primary focus is on the compensation of the victim’s harm. However, if this 
is the case, it may be worthwhile to investigate alternative methods that may very well be more 
effective in achieving that goal. For a detailed discussion of these and related matters, see, further, 
Wessels 2018: 36–115. 
10 See Wessels 2018: 105–112, 171–177 for a critical discussion of two cases (Shabalala v Metrorail 
2008 (3) SA 142 (SCA) and Mashongwa v Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa 2016 (3) SA 
528 (CC)) in particular that illustrate this point. 
11 For a detailed analysis of all of the aspects of these statutes that have a bearing on the issue of 
crime victim compensation, see, generally, Wessels 2018: 112–123. 
12 New Zealand was the first jurisdiction to adopt a crime victim compensation scheme in 1963, 
shortly followed by the United Kingdom (UK), where such a scheme became operative in 1964. 
Thereafter, this solution was also endorsed in several European jurisdictions, as well as in various 
Australian, American and Canadian states and territories. A detailed description of the historical 
development leading to the enactment of these schemes and a discussion of the operation of the 
schemes in the respective jurisdictions fall outside the scope of this contribution. However, for a 
comprehensive discussion of these issues, see, in general, Scott 1967; Cameron 1963; Fry 1959; 
Goodey 2003; Greer 1996; McGillis & Smith 1983; National Center for Victims of Crime 2004; 
Canadian Resource Center for Victims of Crime sd; Miers 2014; and Wessels 2018: 226–237, 243–
318 for a critical analysis of some of the existing policies and programmes that have a  bearing on 
the position of crime victims in South Africa and for a detailed comparison between the crime 
victim compensation schemes in the UK and the Netherlands (including a discussion of the 
practical considerations that may have to be taken into account, should the South African 
legislature decide to enact such a scheme). 
13 Cane 2013: 303–308. 
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difficult to find a satisfactory rationale for singling out violent-crime victims from 
other groups of unfortunates for special treatment by the state”.15 
The problem with justifying statutory development through the enactment of a 
crime victim compensation fund has also been highlighted in South Africa. It may 
be recalled that the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) examined this 
potential alternative and published a report on their findings in 2004 (SALRC 
Report),16 while a doctoral dissertation17 also examined the establishment of a 
compensation fund. However, neither of these research projects dealt with the issue 
of justification.18 
Justifying the potential enactment of a statutory crime victim compensation fund 
is important for a number of reasons. Obviously, as the SALRC itself pointed out, 
“developing a motivation for the establishment of a [statutory compensation fund] in 
SA remains incomplete, and must be completed if legislation is to be drafted, since 
no law should be passed without its objectives being clearly defined and costed”.19 
Indeed, intervention of this kind, which necessarily requires taxpayer funding, would 
require a justifiable policy basis to explain why preferential treatment is being offered 
to crime victims as a specific category. Also, one would need a basis of this kind to 
inform the purpose, scope and extent of the statute, if it were to be enacted. A clear 
policy framework would further assist in guiding interpretation of particular 
provisions of the potential act. Without such a basis, the statute may present potential 
crime victims, administrators and courts with an undesirable level of uncertainty. 
To investigate the justifiability of a crime victim compensation fund, the 
following approach will be adopted. This contribution will advance a theoretical 
framework that provides an outline for justifiable statutory reform of the law of delict 
insofar as the compensation of victims is generally concerned. This will be done by 
identifying legal and public policy considerations that the legislature have 
 
15 SALRC 2004: 182. 
16 Idem passim. 
17 See Von Bonde 2007. 
18 The SALRC’s report provides a summary of the violent crime situation in South Africa and of the 
impact of crime on South Africa; outlines the South African legal system’s compensatory regime, 
provides a comparative overview of the compensation funds for violent crime victims established 
in some foreign jurisdictions and deals briefly with the advantages and disadvantages of 
establishing a compensation fund for crime victims in South Africa; examines the role of the 
criminal justice system in addressing the harm done to the victim of crime. However, it does not 
set out the legal and public policy considerations that may justify the legislative development of 
the law of delict. Similarly, Von Bonde’s thesis focuses on the rationale underlying the restitution 
of crime victims; sets out the historical development of the compensation fund for crime victims 
in foreign jurisdictions; provides a comparative overview of the compensation funds that have 
been established in foreign jurisdictions (including England, India and New Zealand); and 
examines the role of the criminal justice system (both in South Africa and abroad) in providing 
compensation to crime victims. However, it does not provide a justificatory framework for the 
statutory intervention in the law of delict. 









used in the past to develop the law relating to the compensation of specific categories 
of victims. Only once this has been done, can attention be given to the more specific 
question, namely whether the potential enactment of a statutory compensation fund 
for crime victims could fit into such a framework.20 
In surveying the historical development of specific South African statutes that 
have had a major impact on the common law of delict, attention will specifically  be 
paid to the following statutes: the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA), the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (RAF 
Act), as amended by the Road Accident Fund Amendment Act 15 of 2005 (RAFA 
Act) and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA). Although there are several 
other statutes that have had a notable influence on the law of delict,21  the focus   will 
be on these statutes because they predominantly deal with the compensation   of a 
specific group of victims of harm: motor vehicle accident victims, victims of 
defective consumer products and those who suffer harm as a result of occupational 
injuries and diseases. In some way or another, all of these statutes have singled out a 
collection of individuals for preferential treatment while aligning themselves with 
the primary function of the law of delict, namely the compensation of harm.22 In 
addition, COIDA and the RAF Act have also established statutory compensation 
funds. Considering that the aim here is to investigate the feasibility of establishing a 
fund designed to compensate a different group of victims, it is appropriate to examine 
the legal and public policy considerations that have justified the enactment of these 
specific statutes. 
The considerations that are discussed in greater detail include the following: 
First, the need to combat the risk of harm, the role of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) and the need to promote the constitutional right 
to social security,  as well as evidentiary problems relating to the application of    the 
common-law fault requirement will be given attention. Thereafter, an analysis 
follows of the general dissatisfaction with the high transaction costs and levels of 
under-compensation characteristic of the civil procedural system, the preference for 
statutory as opposed to judicial reform and the need to avoid arbitrary outcomes. In 
conducting this investigation, use is at times made of legal comparative methodology, 
which has proven to be an instructive tool to understand domestic law and to evaluate 
it in the light of the experiences of other jurisdictions. 
20 This question has been dealt with in Wessels 2018: 189–239, where the author deals with the 
policy considerations in the specific context of crime victim compensation, and will form the basis 
for a separate article. 
21 For example, the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956, which was described as being the 
“most important piece of law reform that has been carried out in the field of private law since 
Union”. See McKerron 1956: 1. 
22 For overviews of the function of the law of delict, see Macintosh 1926: 1; Van den Heever 1944: 3; 
McKerron 1971: passim; Van der Merwe & Olivier 1976: 1–3; Neethling & Potgieter 2015: 3–17; 
Van der Walt & Midgley 2016: passim; Loubser & Midgley 2017: 9–15. These authors are in 
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Lastly, it may be added that a similar problem regarding justification has also 
been identified in the context of the state’s expanding liability for harm arising from 
medical malpractice in the public healthcare sector.23 As a response to this 
development, the state has tabled the State Liability Amendment Bill of 2018, which, 
essentially, proposes the introduction of structured settlements and the making of 
periodic payments to certain victims of medical malpractice. When commenting  on 
the Bill in its parliamentary submission, the South African Law Society argued that 
“[s]ingling out victims of wrongful medical treatment at the hands of the State for 
‘structured payments’ and denying lump sums for future losses and expenses is 
clearly discriminatory [and] impermissibly differentiates between victims of medical 
wrongdoing and other victims injured by the State and in so doing it limits the right 
to equal protection and benefit of the law guaranteed by Section 9(1)”.24 Therefore, 
the theoretical framework that this contribution seeks to establish may also be used 
to guide subsequent deliberation on whether the potential legislative development of 
the law of delict relating to medical malpractice compensation may be justified. 
 
2 Legal and public policy considerations that have 
justified the statutory reform of the South African law 
of delict 
 
2   1 The need to combat the risk of harm 
Generally, the existence and extent of a risk of harm has played an important role  in 
the South African legislature’s decision to develop the law of delict.25 This has 
especially been the case in the context of motor vehicle accidents, occupational 
injuries and diseases, and defective consumer products. 
 
2  1  1 Motor vehicle accidents 
The introduction of the motor vehicle towards the end of the nineteenth century had 
profound consequences of a technical, social, financial and legal nature.26 One of the 
effects that accompanied its introduction to the marketplace was the increased risk 
of harm to especially bodily integrity and property. Arguably, this characteristic 
 
23 For an overview of the expansion of state delictual liability within that context, see, generally, 
SALRC 2017; Wessels 2019: 1–23. 
24 Law Society of South Africa 2018: 8. 
25 See Loubser 1993: 3; Van der Nest 2003: 501–516; Olivier 2007a: pars 158–159; Loubser & Reid 
2012: 4–5. For a comparative perspective, see, also, Cane 2013: 326–357, 459–487; Stapleton 
1994: 6; Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 51–60, 599–604; Markesinis & Unberath 2002: 
714–717, 724–729. 









of motor vehicles provided the dominant reason for legislative reform within this 
context.27 Writing about the general impact that motor vehicles have had on the law 
of delict, Cooper states:28 
A motor car is a potentially dangerous machine. Its technical improvement, with the attendant 
increase in speed, and the increase in the volume of vehicular road traffic, with the inevitable 
increase in the number of accidents (which can be described as the materialization of the risk 
inherent in the operation of the motor car), have confronted the courts with a variety of 
delictual problems requiring judicial determination. In the process the motor car has become 
the single most potent instrument for the development and reform of the law of delict in the 
twentieth century. 
More specifically, the rise of motor vehicles produced an increase of two types of 
risk. First, the rise in motor vehicle traffic has brought about a significant increase in 
risk to the bodily integrity and property of drivers, passengers and pedestrians.29 This 
is substantiated by the available data in respect of the use of motor vehicles in South 
Africa.30 Further, when this risk of injury materialises as the result of the culpable 
conduct of another, the victim may institute a delictual claim against the wrongdoer 
in search of compensation of his harm.31 Wrongdoers, however, are often unable to 
pay any or all of the damages required to repair the victim’s harm.32 In Law Society 
of South Africa v Minister for Transport,33 Moseneke DCJ remarked that, “[in his] 
view, the number of drivers and owners who would be able to pay would be very 
small”.34 In turn, this inability may expose a wrongdoer’s victim to the further risk of 
receiving limited or no compensation in respect of the harm they suffered.35 Nugent 
JA referred to the impact that risk has in this context as follows:36 
People need cars, cars knock people over, people are injured, we cannot bear the cost of 
knocking people over. It is inherently risky for those who knock people over and for those 
 
27 Idem at 2–3. 
28 Idem at 2. 
29 Loubser 1993: 3; Van der Nest 2003: 501–516; Olivier 2007a: pars 158–159. 
30 For an overview of all of the relevant data, see, generally, Wessels 2018: 136. For present purposes 
it would suffice to note that along with the rise in the number of motor vehicles between 1935 and 
2000 (284 216 to 6 814 531), there has been a significant rise in the amount of people injured as a 
result of motor vehicle accidents (13 532 to 159 704). 
31 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) par 50. 
Recent amendments to the RAF Act have, however, abolished the motor vehicle accident victim’s 
common-law claim against wrongdoers. See, further, Wessels 2018: 291–295. 
32 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd 1953 (2) 
SA 546 (AD) at 551; Loubser 1993: 3; Van der Nest 2003: 502; Olivier 2007a: pars 58–159; 
Olivier 2007b: pars 10–21. 
33 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC). 
34 Idem par 50. 
35 Loubser 1993: 3; Van der Nest 2003: 502; Olivier 2007a: pars 158–159. 
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who are knocked over. The two problems are: People who are driving cannot afford the risk 
of knocking people over and the people who are using the roads cannot afford the risk of 
being knocked over. 
To protect road users from the potential realisation of these risks and to ensure the 
compensation of motor vehicle accident victims, the South African legislature decided 
to intervene in the law of delict by enacting motor vehicle accident legislation. To  a 
certain extent, the legislation that was introduced in this context was based on similar 
statutes enacted by the English legislature during the course of the 1930s.37 It might 
therefore be worthwhile to reflect on the policy reasons that influenced the English 
legislature in this regard. 
During the first part of the nineteenth century, under traditional “ʻhorse and 
buggy law’ … the driver or rider was only liable in so far as he was at fault”.38 
Following the judgement in Rylands v Fletcher,39 however, the theory of strict 
liability emerged, as a result of which it was held that damages could be payable 
when injury was inflicted in the course of conducting a business for profit, even     if 
there was no question of fault.40 It was argued that, if a car damaged people or 
property, the person who brought the car onto the highway should be held strictly 
liable.41 This development, however, came to a halt in Wing v London General 
Omnibus Company,42 when the Court of Appeal dismissed the notion that motor cars 
were, generally speaking, inherently dangerous things. The effect of this judgement 
was that the law of torts relating to motor vehicle accidents in the early twentieth 
century was made to rest “squarely upon the basis of fault liability upon which it has 
rested ever since”.43 
Although the number of motor vehicle accidents in the UK was initially small 
and ownership of vehicles was restricted to a limited, wealthy class, they gradually 
became cheaper, which meant that ownership became more widespread.44 The 
significant rise in motor vehicles in the UK resulted in a substantial surge in the 
number of motor vehicle accidents.45 The fact that the appeal for reform of the branch 
of law dealing with the compensation of harm caused by motor vehicle accidents 
reached a highpoint during this period is therefore unsurprising.46 Bartrip describes 
the increased use of motor vehicles and its accompanying risk of harm as follows:47 
 
37 Op’t Hof v SA Fire & Accident Insurance Co Ltd 1949 (4) SA 741 (W) at 743. 
38 Spencer 1983: 65–66. 
39 [1868] UKHL 1. 
40 Bartrip 2010a: 266. 
41 Spencer 1983: 65–66. 
42 [1909] 2 KB 652 at 666–667. 
43 Spencer 1983: 66–73. 
44 Merkin & Dzibion 2013: 307. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Bartrip 2010a: 263. 









Whatever the perceived or alleged benefits of motorised transport, it cannot be doubted that 
motor vehicles took a tremendous toll of human life and limb in twentieth-century Britain. 
Official records for the years 1930 to 1939 (inclusive) indicate that 69 824 people died on 
Britain’s roads, at an average rate of just over 7 000 per year. Between 1920, when records 
began, and 1930 the annual number of road deaths rose at a staggering rate from 4 886 to 7 305. 
To address the issue of motor vehicle accidents and related matters, a Royal 
Commission was appointed in 1928. On the basis of its recommendations, a Bill was 
proposed and ultimately passed by the English legislature as the Road Traffic Act of 
1930. Significantly, the Act introduced a system of third-party compulsory 
insurance, making it unlawful to use a motor vehicle unless an insurance policy in 
respect of “third party risks” was in force.48 This system of compulsory third-party 
insurance has been maintained under the Road Traffic Act of 1988.49 
Similar to England, South Africa experienced a dramatic increase in the use of 
motor vehicles during the course of the 1930s, which brought with it an increase   in 
motor vehicle accidents.50 Analogous to the situation in England, this led to 
considerable pressure on the South African legislature to alleviate the plight of road 
accident victims.51 The need was expressed to protect motor vehicle accident victims 
against the possibility of limited or no recovery of harm, because the wrongdoer “was 
a ‘man of straw’ and unable to pay the road accident victim’s loss or damage”.52 
Accordingly, the South African legislature followed the lead of the English legislature 
in 1939 when it decided to introduce the first Bill aimed at protecting motor vehicle 
accident victims. During a debate of the Bill, the Minister of Finance referred to the 
legal and public policy considerations underlying justifiable legislative reform of the 
law of delict within this context:53 
I am of the view that this Bill may be described as one which is designed to meet a long-felt 
want. Its object is to ensure the payment of compensation for injuries or death caused by 
negligence in the use of motor transport. I think honorable members are aware that there are 
a considerable number of motor vehicles in the Union driven by people who are not insured 
against what are known as third party risks. I think I shall probably be correct in saying that 
that is the case with the majority of the motor vehicles in the Union, and that, of course, 
 
48 Deak 1936: 566. 
49 See s 143 of the Road Traffic Act (c 52) of 1988. 
50 See, also, the second reading of the draft Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 29 of 1942 in Parliament, 
where the Minister of Finance refers to this consideration as legal and public policy consideration 
justifying the Act: Debatte van die Volksraad Deel 43 1942: 1255–1259. For an overview of all 
the relevant data, see the table in Wessels 2018: 136. To illustrate the above point, however, it 
would suffice to note that along with the rise in motor vehicles between 1935 and 2000 (284 216 
to 6 814 531), there has been a significant rise in the amount of people injured as a result of motor 
vehicle accidents (13 532 to 159 704). 
51 Road Accident Fund Commission (RAFC) 2002: 108–112. 
52 Idem at 108. 
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means that when harm is brought about through the negligence of an uninsured motorist and 
he is unable to meet a claim for compensation, the innocent victim is left without any redress. 
The Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 29 of 1942 ultimately came into effect in 1946. Its 
aim, as stated in its preamble, was to “provide for compensation for certain loss or 
damage caused unlawfully by means of motor vehicles and for matters incidental 
thereto”. The Act introduced compulsory third-party insurance on a national scale 
and compelled the owners of motor vehicles, generally, to take out insurance so that 
motor vehicle accident victims may be properly compensated for the harm they 
suffered arising from the negligent and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.54 
In Rose’s Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Grant,55 the Appellate Division confirmed that the 
intention behind the legislature’s decision was to ensure, through the compulsory 
insurance of motor vehicles, that injured persons or their dependants who might  not 
be able to recover damages owing to the inability of the parties liable to pay, should 
receive full compensation from insurers in as many cases as possible. Shortly 
thereafter, in Aetna Insurance Co v Minister of Justice, the same court reaffirmed the 
purpose of the legislative intervention as follows:56 
The obvious evil that [the Act] is designed to remedy is that members of the public who  are 
injured, and the dependants of those who are killed, through the negligent driving of motor 
vehicles may find themselves without redress against the wrongdoer. If the driver of the 
motor vehicle or his master is without means and is uninsured, the person who has been 
injured or his dependants, if he has been killed, are in fact remediless and are compelled   to 
bear the loss themselves. To  remedy that evil, the Act provides a system of compul-  sory 
insurance. 
The 1942 Act underwent regular amendments and was replaced by the Compulsory 
Motor Vehicle Insurance Act 56 of 1972, which came into operation in 1972. The 
motivation behind the enactment of new legislation was not to pursue a purpose 
different to that outlined above, but rather to amend the mechanics by means of which 
the aim was sought to be achieved.57 As is evident from a series of cases dealing with 
liability under the 1972 Act,58 the legislature’s primary focus was still 
54 Klopper 2000: 3; Cooper 1996: 3. See, also, RAFC 2002: 110: The insurance would cover harm as 
a result of bodily injuries or death of a breadwinner arising from the culpable and unlawful driving 
of a motor vehicle, but did not cover property damage or other harm that may have been suffered 
as a result of the accident. 
55     1948 (2) SA 466 (A) at 471. 
56     1960 (3) SA 273 (A) at 285. 
57 The Act required the insurance of the vehicle and not insurance of the owner or driver. It also 
provided cover (through the newly established Motor Vehicle Assurance Fund), for the first time, 
for loss occasioned by uninsured or unidentified motor vehicles. See, further, Law Society of South 
Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) par 20. 
58 See Commercial Union Assurance Company of South Africa Ltd v Clarke 1972 (3) SA 508 (AD) 
at 518; AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Biddulph 1976 (1) SA 725 (AD) at 738; Webster 
v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1977 (2) SA 874 (AD) at 881; Nkisimane v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 









the protection of those who suffer harm59 as a result of motor vehicle accidents and 
who might be unable to recover damages owing to the wrongdoer’s inability to pay 
compensation.60 Similar to its predecessor, the Act was based on the common-law 
principles of delictual liability, which required an accident victim to prove that his 
harm had been caused by the culpable and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle. 
The 1972 Act was substituted by the Motor Vehicle Accident Act 84 of 1986 
(MVA Act). The MVA Act, which came into operation in 1986, introduced a number 
of changes.61 Importantly, it replaced the former system of compulsory third-party 
insurance with a system of statutory assumption of liability in respect of harm suffered 
by road users as a result of the negligent and unlawful driving of a motor vehicle.62 
To achieve this, the legislature established the Motor Vehicle Accident Fund (MVA 
Fund), financed by fuel levies, to fund the new statutory system of compensation  of 
harm. Because the MVA Act was effective only in South Africa and Namibia, but not 
in the former so-called independent territories of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda 
and Ciskei, the Multilateral Motor Vehicle Accidents Fund Act 93 of 1989 (MMF 
Act) was enacted in 1986 with the view to bringing about a uniform system of third-
party compensation.63 The MMF Act remained applicable up to 1997, when the 
newly enacted RAF Act came into operation. 
The RAF Act essentially has the same object as that of its predecessors, namely 
the “payment of compensation for loss or damage wrongfully caused by the driving 
of motor vehicles”.64 It was based on the common-law elements for delictual liability 
and has retained fault as the basis for liability. Although it has been argued that   the 
effect of the Act was to “suspend the common law delictual action against the 
wrongdoer and to compel the road accident victim to institute his claim against the 
Road Accident Fund”,65 the delictual claim of the victim was left intact and victims 
therefore had the option of instituting a claim against the wrongdoer in respect of 
harm that was not covered under the RAF Act. 
 
 
59 As was the case with its predecessor, the insurance policies taken out as a result of the Act would 
cover only harm arising from bodily injuries or the death or bodily injuries of a breadwinner. 
60 The preamble of the Act reads as follows: “To provide for the compulsory insurance of certain 
motor vehicles in order to ensure the payment of compensation for certain loss or damage 
unlawfully caused by the driving of such motor vehicles; for the payment of compensation where 
the loss or damage is caused by the driving of an uninsured or unidentified motor vehicle; and for 
incidental matters.” See, also, Suzman, Gordes & Hodes 1982: 4–6. 
61 Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) par 21; Klopper 2000: 
4. 
62 Klopper 2000: 4. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Section 3 of the RAF Act. See, also, RAFC 2002: 111–112: Not all damage caused by the unlawful 
and negligent driving of a motor vehicle can be recovered from the RAF. See Wessels 2018: 307–
309 for a discussion of the limitation and exclusion of liability under the RAF Act. 
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In its 2002 report, the Road Accident Fund Commission (RAFC) described the 
fault-based compensation system established under the RAF Act as “unreasonable, 
inequitable, unaffordable and unsustainable”.66 Among other things, the RAFC found 
that the Act’s insistence on fault-based liability contributed to its financial decline. 
The criticism of the RAF Act’s fault-based liability regime is discussed in further 
detail in part 2.3 below. 
The victim’s common-law right to claim compensation from a wrongdoer for 
harm that is not compensable under the RAF Act was abolished by section 9 of the 
RAFA Act, which came into force on 1 August 2008. In Law Society of South Africa 
v Minister for Transport,67 the Constitutional Court was requested to consider the 
constitutional validity of this amendment.68 
In its judgement, the Constitutional Court referred also to the dominant 
consideration that triggered the amendment – the need to compensate victims of 
harm that manifests when the risk created by motor vehicles materialises – as well as 
future reform of the system. In this context, reference was made to the legislature’s 
intention to ultimately replace the common-law system of compensation with a set 
of limited no-fault benefits that would form part of a broader social security net as 
public financial support for people who are poor, have a disability or are vulnerable.69 
The amendments introduced by the RAFA Act provide further evidence of 
the primary consideration that underlies the enactment of motor vehicle accident 
legislation in South Africa, namely that it aims to provide compensation where the 
risk of harm associated with motor vehicle accidents materialises. As explained by 
the Minister of Transport, although the economic viability of the RAF is an important 
goal, the ultimate vision is that a new system of compensation for motor vehicle 
accident victims must be established and integrated into a comprehensive social 
security system that offers life, disability and health insurance cover for all accidents 
and diseases.70 To achieve the desired reform, the legislature therefore drafted the 
Road Accident Benefit Scheme Bill (RABS) in 2014. Should it be enacted, the 
current fault-based system of liability administered by the RAF will be replaced by 
a new social security scheme for road accidents. 
The need to further the constitutional right to social security as a consideration 
justifying legislative intervention in the law of delict is analysed in part 2.2 below. 
For the purpose of this part of the contribution, it is sufficient to note here that the 
proposed RABS is aimed not only at continuing the achievement of the primary aim 
outlined by its predecessors, namely the protection of the victim’s interests by 
 
66 Department of Transport 2011: 13. 
67 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC). 
68 Idem par 15. A detailed discussion of that judgement falls outside the scope and focus of this 
contribution. However, in this regard, see Wessels 2018: 291–297. 










ensuring that he is properly compensated, but also at the promotion of the wrongdoer’s 
interest insofar as the victim’s common-law right to claim damages for residual harm 
has been abolished. In doing so, it may be argued that the legislature seeks to address 
not only the risk of no compensation to which road users are generally exposed, but 
also the risk of liability to which culpable road users may be exposed.71 
It appears that motor vehicle accident legislation may be regarded as “social 
legislation”72 aimed at the “widest possible protection and compensation”73 of road 
users by compensating them against harm that arises from the culpable and unlawful 
driving of a motor vehicle. 
The RAF Act, its predecessors and its proposed successor provides for the 
substitution of a compensation fund or an insurance company in the place of a 
culpable wrongdoer to ensure compensation for a motor vehicle accident victim    or 
his family.74 These legislative developments resulted in a conceptual shift from 
protection of the wrongdoer to acceptance of the need to provide protection and 
support for all victims of road accidents.75 
The replacement of the wrongdoer by the RAF undermines the notion that the 
victim’s harm should be compensated – or corrected – by the person who culpably 
and wrongfully caused it. The fund’s existence is therefore arguably not aligned with 
the so-called corrective justice account for the South African law of delict.76 
Proponents of the corrective justice account highlight the fact that, properly 
understood, there must be  correlativity  between  the  person  who  has  the  duty  to 
rectify the wrong and the person who has suffered the wrong. The corrective justice 
account of the law of delict may be contrasted with a distributive justice- based 
justification for this branch of the law. Whereas the latter is concerned with the 
allocation of resources throughout society as a whole and the criteria on which such 
an allocation occurs, the basic idea with the former is to do justice between two 
parties, namely, it is concerned with whether there should be any allocation and if so, 
to what extent and in what form and on what basis from one person back to another. 
In other words, from a corrective justice point of view, the law of delict is concerned 
with justice as between the plaintiff and wrongdoer. Likewise, it is not – 
 
71 See the statement of Nugent JA referred to in n 36 supra. 
72 Pithey v Road Accident Fund 2014 (4) SA 112 (SCA) par 18 (footnotes omitted). 
73 Ibid. 
74 Olivier 2007a: par 159. 
75 Ibid. 
76 For a detailed discussion of this issue, see Fagan 2012: 130–155. For a discussion of corrective 
justice generally, see Weinrib 1995; Weinrib 2002: 34; Fletcher 1972: 537; Coleman 1982: 421–
440; Coleman 1987: 451–470; Coleman 1992a: 427–444; Coleman 1992b; Coleman 1992c: 349–
378; Coleman 1995a: 53–73; Coleman 1995b: 1148–1170. The issue is not specifically relevant 
to this contribution, but see Wessels 2018: 334–338 for commentary on the function of the 
contemporary South African law of delict and whether it may be understood as solely aimed at 
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and should not – be concerned with a global economic picture. Rather, the principles 
of bipolarity, correlativity and equality should obtain. 
Nonetheless, the RAF may be said to fulfil the primary function of the law of 
delict (compensation of harm), remains based on delictual principles for the time 
being and is regarded by academics as constituting a part of the South African law 
of delict.77 
Lastly, it may be said that, although the legislative intervention did not result  in 
the decrease of the risk of harm arising from the use of motor vehicles, namely  in 
securing general road safety or deterring future motor vehicle accidents, or in 
deterring future motor vehicle accidents, it was successful insofar as addressing  the 
risk of litigating “against drivers who often were not in a financial position to 
compensate accident victims for their losses”.78 
 
2  1  2   Occupational injuries and diseases 
The exposure to risk of harm and associated risk of no compensation has also served 
as significant motivation for the enactment of legislation aimed at compensating 
employees who are injured or become diseased during the course and scope of  their 
employment.79 Generally, legislative intervention within this context may be justified 
on the basis that employers often expose their employees to risks specifically 
associated with their activities as employees, such as to suffer an accident at work or 
to sustain an illness that is related to a specific health risk of the task assigned to the 
employee.80 
Apart from exposing their employees to specific risks associated with their 
employment activities, an employer exposes the employee to the additional risk    of 
no compensation in the event that the risk of harm materialises. Of course, the 
exposure to these risks occurs while the employer stands to benefit financially from 
the efforts of his employee. 
Prior to legislative intervention, the position of South African employees who 
were injured at the workplace was similar to that of motor vehicle accident victims 
in the pre-legislation era in that they had to institute a common-law delictual claim 
against their employer to obtain compensation for the harm they had suffered.81 In 
doing so, they were required to prove that, amongst other things, their employer was 
at fault, which typically meant that they had to prove their employer’s negligence. 
 
77 For example, a discussion of the salient provisions of the RAF is included in Loubser & Midgley 
2017: 556–564. 
78 Department of Transport 2011: 6. 
79 See Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) at 1; Markesinis & Unberath 
2002: 728–230; Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 253–257. 
80 Markesinis & Unberath 2002: 728. 
81 Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd 1953 (2) 









As was the case with motor vehicle accident legislation, the South African statutes 
that were enacted to develop the law of delict in this context  were  based on similar 
English statutes enacted during the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.82 
Despite it being possible for employees in nineteenth-century England to 
institute tort claims against their employers for personal injuries suffered in the 
workplace as a result of their employers’ negligence, employees generally did not do 
so.83 This may be as a result of a variety of legal considerations, including the 
difficulty in proving fault in the form of negligence,84 and the existence of “several 
draconian defences”,85 such as the doctrine of common employment, contributory 
negligence and volenti non fit iniuria, which, to a large extent, enabled employers to 
evade tortious liability for harm caused to an employee during the course and scope 
of employment.86 Additional social, political and economic considerations that made 
it problematic for English employees to institute tort claims against their employers 
have been described as follows:87 
[M]any workers never thought of suing because they were not even aware that a wrong  had 
been done to them. An accident was an everyday occurrence and part of their way of life, 
and the risk of injury was seen as in the hands of Fate rather than the employer. If workers 
were aware that a wrong had been done, they were often ignorant of the possibility of 
bringing a claim. Those who knew of the tort system found it very difficult to get legal advice. 
If they did sue, they faced the prospect of incurring legal costs. A more significant deterrent 
was the likelihood that a tort claim would lead to the loss of work-related benefits such as 
employer’s sick pay, or continued employment in an easier job, or medical treatment from 
work doctors. Suing an employer often meant antagonising the most powerful men in the 
region and jeopardizing not only one’s employment prospects, but also one’s housing, church 
membership and even access to town poor relief. Nor could workers easily endure the lengthy, 
complicated and uncertain litigation process itself. Their claims then were opposed by the 
best lawyers and by morally questionable defence strategies. The final difficulty faced by the 
workers was that they often needed what tort could not supply: urgent recompense to replace 
their wage loss. 
 
Other policy considerations that influenced the English legislature to interfere with 
the status quo and to develop the law relating to harm suffered by employees in   the 
course and scope of their employment, may be summarised as follows: the demand 
for workplace safety, the continuing pressure  exerted  by  trade  unions and industrial 
disputes, the courts’ reaffirmation of workers’ entitlement to a high 
 
82 Victoria Falls Power Co Ltd v Lloyd NO 1908 TS 1164 at 1165, 1182; Select Committee of the 
House of Assembly 1904: 15, 17–18. 
83 Stein 2008: 935 submits that, in England, the first reported decision of an employer being sued in 
tort by his employee for a personal injury suffered at the workplace may be traced to 1837. 
84 See part 2.3 infra. 
85 Lewis 2012: 138. 
86 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 541–545; Deakin 2013: 253–257. 
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degree of protection, the steady growth of litigation concerning workplace accidents 
that became an accepted part of the employment system and the fact that liability 
insurance became readily available for employers after 1880.88 In addition, the 
industrial revolution in nineteenth-century England caused a significant increase   in 
industrial accidents in the form of, among others, railroad crashes, coalmine 
explosions and steamboat fires.89 
The English legislature responded by enacting the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act in 1897. It thereby introduced a no-fault based compensatory system outside 
tort.90 The 1897 Act imposed a statutory duty on employers to make limited payments 
to the victims of industrial accidents, irrespective of whether those injuries resulted 
from the culpable wrongdoing of the employer – as long as the accidents arose out 
of and in the course of employment.91 The decision to hold the employer liable 
regardless of whether or not they acted culpably may be explained with reference to 
the concept of enterprise risk or enterprise liability.92 In this regard, Deakin writes:93 
The employer as “enterpriseˮ has a duty of care to have regard for the safety and welfare  of 
its employees and incurs liability to third parties injured by the negligence of those employees 
not simply because it has “deep pocketsˮ or because of a supposed symmetry between risks 
and profits, but because its organisational capacity enables it to manage the risks of injury 
internally, through the bureaucratic structures of the firm, while its financial resources and 
position in the market make it possible for it to absorb and channel potential liabilities 
through insurance. Insurance … makes it possible for firms to shift certain losses, but also 
sets implicit standards of care, which operate through the monitoring activities, undertaken 
by liability insurers. 
The first local legislation aimed at addressing the issue of compensation for 
employees was the Cape Employer’s Liability Act 35 of 1886, which was replaced 
by the enactment of the Workmen’s Compensation Act 40 of 1905 (Cape of Good 
Hope).94 Many of the policy considerations underlying the 1905 Act, as well as 
succeeding legislative interventions are reflected in the 1904 Report of the Select 
Committee on Compensation to Workmen. 
From its report, it is clear that there was significant concern about securing 
compensation for injured employees and doing so as “quickly and as cheaply as 
possible”.95 It was stated that one of the chief advantages of introducing statutory 
 
88 Hedley 2013: 235–242. 
89 Kleeberg 2003: 57–58. 
90 Lewis 2012: 140. 
91 Ibid; Brodie 2010: 2. 
92 Brodie 2010: 2–7. 
93 Deakin 2013: 254. 
94 The Act is based on the English Act of 1897. See Select Committee 1904: 15, 17. See, also, Jansen 
van Vuuren 2013: 25. 
95 Select Committee 1904: 2. See, also, at 9 and 14, where it is made clear that all relevant parties 
sought a way to deal with employer and employee disputes as quickly and cheaply as possible and 









reform would be that it would provide what the law of delict failed to do at the time, 
namely the speedy provision of a fixed amount of money in lieu of the lost wages and 
to “ensure that the sum shall be paid with as little litigation as possible”.96 
Another consideration that justified the legislature’s intended development of 
this branch of the law was the fact that, in “ninety-nine cases out of every hundred 
the workman does not know what he can demand, and if his employer pays him 
anything at all he considers it as an act of charity. In the great majority of cases he 
has an action, and does not bring it”.97 
It was also argued that the enactment of legislation would undermine the 
influence that the defence of contributory negligence had on an employee’s potential 
common-law delictual claim for damages, namely to give the employee an action 
despite the fact that his negligence contributed towards the accident.98 
Lastly, the employees sought to improve their safety:99 
From a workmen’s point of view the Bill is a most desirable one in every respect. At the 
present time workmen are entirely dependent on the generosity of their employers for 
compensation. Now, gentlemen, it is but natural that an employer of labour should desire to 
obtain the utmost amount of work for the least possible cost; in the pursuit of that object he is 
apt to overlook certain precautionary measures which he should take to ensure the safety of 
his workmen, and we maintain that there should be such an Act so based that it would compel 
the employer to take these precautionary measures. 
Therefore, it seems that the decision by the legislature to develop the law of delict 
relating to the compensation of employees were motivated by similar policy 
considerations than those underlying the English legislature’s development of law of 
negligence regarding workplace injuries and diseases. 
A similar statute, the Workmen’s Compensation Act 36 of 1907, was enacted in 
the Transvaal.100 The Transvaal Act was “almost identical”101 to the English 
Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1906. The Act applied to the  whole  country after 
unification in 1910, but was replaced by the Workmen’s Compensation Act  25 of 
1914, which, in turn, included a series of industrial diseases following an amendment 
in 1917 through the Workmen’s Compensation (Industrial Diseases) Act 
 
 
96 Idem at 12. 
97 Idem at 14. 
98 Ibid. It may be noted that the doctrine of common employment was not considered a part of the 
South African common law of delict: Waring & Gillow v Sherborne 1904 TS 340. Accordingly, 
unlike the position in England, it did not play the same role in motivating legislative change. 
99 Select Committee 1904: 64–65. 
100 Jansen van Vuuren 2013: 25. 
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13 of 1917.102 Importantly, both these Acts required employees to prove fault on the 
part of the employer.103 
In its early form, the Workmen’s Compensation Act was ineffective at providing 
adequate compensation, because employers were not compelled to insure their 
employees against the risk of workplace injuries.104 As a result, employers that did 
not have insurance could face insolvency if they were held liable for their employees’ 
harm. Also, injured or diseased employees were exposed to the risk that the employer 
would not be in a position to provide compensation, thereby rendering the employee 
potentially unable to earn further income.105 
By 1930, and with the benefit of using the English statute as example, 
employees, industry and the South African government recognised the need for 
compulsory insurance.106  The 1914 and 1917 statutes were accordingly replaced   by 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act 59 of 1934, which provided for a system of 
compensation to be paid by the employer if an employee suffered harm as a result of 
an accident arising in the course and scope of his employment. Pursuant to the 
passing of the Act, employees were no longer required to prove fault on the part   of 
the employer to obtain compensation.107 Importantly, the Act made insurance 
compulsory through private companies rather than a state fund favoured by workers 
and trade unions.108 The office of the Compensation Commissioner was established 
and tasked with the mediation of compensation settlements between employees and 
employers that was ultimately funded through the compulsory insurance obtained by 
employers.109 
The Workmen’s Compensation Act 30 of 1941 replaced the 1934 Act and 
introduced a new system of compensation by establishing a state “accident fund”110 
to which all employers would contribute on the basis of employer’s wage budgets111 
and from which employees were to be compensated.112  Employees were entitled   to 
compensation from the fund if they could prove that they had suffered harm      as a 
result of an “accident arising out of and in the course of … employment and resulting 
in a personal injury”.113 While the Act established a compensation fund, it 
 
102 Jansen van Vuuren 2013: 26; Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) pars 45–46. 
At that stage, similar statutes were also in place in France, Germany, New Zealand and certain 
Australian states. See Select Committee 1904: 14. 
103 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) pars 45–46. 
104 Jansen van Vuuren 2013: 26. 
105 Ibid. 
106 See Budlender 1984: 22–41. 
107 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA) par 16. 
108 United States Agency International Development 2008: 3. 
109 Jansen van Vuuren 2013: 26. 
110 See s 64 of the Act. 
111 See s 68 of the Act. 
112 Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti Ltd 2010 (5) SA 137 (SCA) par 17. 









also indemnified employers against potential delictual claims that employees may 
have had against them.114 In R v Canquan,115 the court summarised the purpose of the 
Act by stating that it was “designed to protect the interests of employees and to 
safeguard their rights, and its effect is to limit the common law rights of employers 
and to enlarge the common law rights of employees”. 
COIDA repealed the Workmen’s Compensation Act and came into operation  in 
1994. It provides for the compensation of employees injured in accidents116 that arose 
out of and in the course of their employment,117 or who contracted occupational 
diseases.118 In accordance with section 15 of the Act, a statutory compensation fund 
was established to which employers are required to contribute119 and from which 
compensation and other benefits are paid to employees.120 In addition to establishing 
a fund from which an employee may obtain limited compensation, section 35(1) of 
the Act abolished the employee’s common-law right to institute a delictual claim 




114 Section 7: “(a) [N]o action at law shall lie by a workman or any dependant of a workman against 
such workman’s employer to recover any damages in respect of an injury due to accident resulting 
in the disablement or the death of such workman; and (b) no liability for compensation on the part 
of such employer shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of any such 
disablement or death.” 
115 1956 (3) SA 355 (E) at 368. 
116 “Accident” is defined as an “accident arising out of and in the course of an employee’s employment 
and resulting in a personal injury, illness or the death of the employee”. 
117 See MEC for Health v DN 2015 (1) SA 182 (SCA) for a discussion on the course and scope of 
employment requirement within the context of COIDA. It may be noted that, apart from COIDA 
and its antecedent legislation, which relates to the interests of all employees in industry generally 
(including commerce and services), another strand of legislative development concentrated 
specifically on the interests of mineworkers. The Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 
78 of 1973 (and its predecessors) was a legislative response to the deleterious diseases contracted 
by mineworkers. Its history may be briefly summarised as follows: The Miners’ Phthisis 
Allowances Act of 1911 was first enacted in 1911, and succeeded in 1912 by the Miners’ Phthisis 
Act of 1912. The 1912 Act was amended by the Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 1914. The 
Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 1914 was succeeded by the Miners’ Phthisis Act of 1916.  It 
repealed parts of the 1912 Act and the whole of the Miners’ Phthisis Amendment Act of 1914. 
The Miners’ Phthisis Acts Consolidation Act of 1925 was enacted in 1925 and was in turn repealed 
by the Silicosis Act of 1946. The Pneumoconiosis Act of 1956 superseded the Silicosis Act. The 
1956 Act was superseded by the Pneumoconiosis Compensation Act of 1962. In 1973, the 
Occupational Diseases in Mines and Works Act 78 of 1973 repealed previous legislation   and 
consolidated the law relating to the payment of compensation in respect of certain diseases 
contracted by persons employed in mines and work. See, further, Mankayi v Anglogold Ashanti 
Ltd 2011 (3) SA 237 (CC) pars 26–35. 
118 See s 65 of COIDA. 
119 Idem s 87. 
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course and scope of the employment.121 When instituting his statutory claim against 
the compensation fund, an employee is not required to prove fault.122 
In the leading judgement on the matter, Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd, 
the Constitutional Court described this development as follows:123 
The Compensation Act supplants the essentially individualistic common-law position, 
typically represented by civil claims of a plaintiff employee against a negligent defendant 
employer, by a system which is intended to and does enable employees to obtain limited 
compensation from a fund to which employers are obliged to contribute. 
As was the case with motor vehicle accidents, the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund appears to undermine the idea that compensation should be  paid 
by the person who culpably and wrongfully caused it, in an attempt to thereby correct 
his wrong. The existence of a compensation fund in this context is therefore similarly 
not aligned with the so-called corrective justice explanation for the law of delict.124 
Notwithstanding, it is successful in achieving the function set out by the law of delict 
– compensation of harm. Arguably, more injured and diseased employees receive 
compensation from the fund than would otherwise have been the case if they were 
required to institute common-law delictual claims against their employers. 
Against this background, it may be said that the development of the law of delict 
by the enactment of legislation that provides compensation for workplace-related 
injuries and diseases may be regarded as a response to the risk of injury to which the 
employee is exposed as a result of his employment, as well as the potential risk of 
not being able to recover any compensation for the harm that is suffered once the risk 
materialises. In Jooste v Supermarket Trading (Pty) Ltd,125 the Constitutional Court 
confirmed the role of risk and remarked that, in the absence of any legislation “there 
would be no guarantee that an award would be recoverable because there would be 
 
121 Section 36 of the Act preserves and regulates an employee’s rights against a third party who may 
incur liability to the employee. 
122 Although the Act therefore continues its predecessor’s abandonment of the fault requirement,    it 
does play a limited role. Section 56(1) of the Act provides that, if a person has met with an accident 
or contracted an occupational disease owing to his or her employer’s negligence, the employee 
may apply to the commissioner to receive increased compensation in addition to the compensation 
normally payable in terms of this Act. 
123 1999 (2) SA 1 (CC) par 15. See, also, MEC for Education, Western Cape Province v Strauss 2008 
(2) SA 366 (SCA) pars 11–12; Healy v Compensation Commissioner 2010 (2) SA 470 (E) par 11; 
Sanan v Eskom Holdings Ltd 2010 (6) SA 638 (GSJ) par 8; MEC for Health, Free State v DN 
2015 (1) SA 182 (SCA) pars 6–7; Thomas v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans 2015 (1) 
253 (SCA) par 6. 
124 This issue falls outside the scope of the current contribution, but for an overview of some of the 
aspects related to the function of the contemporary South African law of delict, see Fagan 2012: 
130–155. See, also, Wessels 2018: 334–338. 









no certainty that the employer would be able to pay large amounts in damages. It 
must also be borne in mind that the employee would incur the risk of having to pay 
the costs of the employer if the case were lost”. 
The exposure to risk has also played a significant role in the adoption of 
workplace legislation in foreign jurisdictions. The adoption of the no-fault based 
legislation to compensate injured and diseased employees is “consistent with a 
widespread moral idea that it is not unjust to impose a strict liability on those who 
cause loss while taking risks in pursuit of commercial profit, even where the risk is 
unforeseeable or cost-justified”.126 
In conclusion, it appears that the leading policy consideration underlying 
legislative development of the law of delict in this field is the attempt to ensure that 
employees will receive compensation, albeit limited, in respect of the materialisation 
of an employment risk during the course and scope of employment.127 It appears that 
the notion of enterprise liability best explains the reason for imposing liability for 
harm on employers specifically. 
 
2  1  3 Defective consumer products 
The design, manufacture, distribution and sale of products and services are, generally, 
central to the wealth and welfare of any society, but bring about disease, injury and 
even death for a wide range of individuals.128 The rise of industrialisation in the 
nineteenth century and consumerism in the twentieth century led to a substantial 
increase in the manufacturing and distribution of consumer products.129 This meant 
that, more than ever before, consumers were being exposed to an unremitting series 
of manufactured goods. Because technology grew more sophisticated and was often 
coupled with expertise, consumers knew very little about the products that reached 
them. It is therefore unsurprising that many of these products posed a significant risk 
to the well-being of consumers who chose to make use of them.130 Even where the 
risk of harm was not particularly great, it was accepted that, should it materialise, the 
harm suffered by the consumer would be severe.131 
In response to the rise in consumer products, the growing risk of exposure to 
harm and the difficulty of holding manufacturers liable for the harm suffered by 
 
126 Stapleton 1994: 195. 
127 Cane 2013: 332. 
128 Van Eeden 2013: 367. Some of the defective consumer products that have caused disease, injury 
and death within this context include pharmaceutical products and other defective medical 
devices, as well as manufactured products (such as motor vehicles, household items and military 
devices) and contaminated food products. 
129   Stapleton 1994: 9–16. 
130   Van Eeden 2013: 370. 
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consumers as a result of defective products, the South African legislature introduced 
a strict liability regime for harm suffered as a result of defective products when it 
enacted the CPA.132 Set out below is a brief overview of the historical development, 
which culminated in the statutory reform of the law of delict in this context. 
As is the case with the rise of product liability as a distinct area of the law in   a 
variety of other jurisdictions, this development in the South African law may be 
traced back to progress made by the courts in the United States of America (USA). 
Indeed, the judicial development of the law by US courts is generally regarded as the 
precursor to the global increase of legislative intervention aimed at compensating 
victims of defective consumer products.133 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, the American judicial innovations 
enabled these victims to litigate against the sellers and manufactures of defective 
products through alterations of the existing tort or contract law.134 The courts’ approach 
was ultimately captured in the American Law Institute’s Second Restatement of 
Torts in 1965, after which, as Reimann135 describes – 
in the 1960s and 1970s, the principle of strict product liability swept through the United 
States, and became the rule in most, though not all, states of the Union. European scholars 
and policy makers watched this development with great interest. In part, they were fascinated 
by the activism of the American courts, which fashioned a new consumer protection regime. 
Because the rise of the strict liability regime is generally regarded as originating 
within the American courts,136 special attention will be placed on the judicial 
expansion of liability for defective consumer products within this jurisdiction. 
The economic expansion that industrialisation produced – in especially the USA 
– was accompanied by a significant increase in the volume of consumer 
transactions.137 The types of products manufactured and sold by way of these 
transactions posed a significantly higher risk of bodily injuries or property damage 
than was the case earlier during the nineteenth century:138 
Sometimes the nature of the new type of good made inspection difficult or impossible at least 
without expert technical advice, which was often in short supply. Even if the intrinsic nature 
of the good did not produce this situation, the volume of transactions and the new forms in 
which products were packaged and delivered often did. But most importantly of all, 
inspection was often rendered difficult if not impossible – at least for commercial buyers 
 
 
132 The Act came into effect in 2010. 
133 Reimann 2015: 251. See, also, Van Eeden 2013: 1–5, 21–22; Reimann 2003: 756, 761; Stapleton 
 1994: 3–36. 
134 Reimann 2015: 251. 
135 Ibid. See, also, Van Eeden 2013: 1–5, 21–22; Reimann 2003: 756–761; Stapleton 1994: 3–36. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Stapleton 1994: 10. 









in the chain – by the increasing number of contracts formed between parties acting at a 
distance, in some cases before the relevant goods had come into existence, and the speed at 
which goods were passed down the lengthening commercial chain. 
Most American consumers who were harmed by manufactured products were faced 
with a stumbling block; because they were not contractually linked to the manufacturer 
in question, they lacked a contractual remedy.139 In cases where a consumer did have 
the option of instituting a contractual claim against a manufacturer, there was the 
possibility that it did not have sufficient funds or insurance to compensate the injured 
consumer for the harm suffered. In other words, much like the victims of motor 
vehicle accidents or those who suffered from injuries or diseases sustained during the 
course and scope of their employment at the turn of the previous century, consumers 
were exposed to an increased risk of harm and its accompanying risk of receiving 
limited or no compensation. 
To deal with this problem, American courts developed contract law in a series of 
cases in the early twentieth century140 so that the requirement of privity of contract 
was partially relinquished and less reliance was placed solely on contract to protect 
consumers from harm as a result of defective products.141   The courts expanded   the 
liability of manufacturers by relying on the idea of a transmissible warranty  that 
goods are free of defects.142 As a result, the action for breach of warranty was 
ultimately made available not only to the immediate purchaser of a product, but also 
to other persons who may reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected 
by the goods.143 
In Greenman v Yuba Products,144 the Supreme Court of California took the first 
steps to move away from the contractual route and laid down a principle of strict 
liability in tort for defective consumer products.145 The gradual development of the 
manufacturer’s liability in American courts ultimately led to the adoption in 1965 of 
section 402A of the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts, which 
purported to provide a strict liability regime for defective products.146 
 
139 See Stapleton 1994: 9–16; Loubser & Reid 2012: 4–9. 
140 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 590–607. 
141 See Loubser & Reid 2012: 24. 
142 Ibid. 
143 The abandonment of privity of contract in favour of protecting a broader consumer interest is 
reflected in the well-known judgement of Traynor J in Escola v Coca-Cola Bottling Co of Fresno 
24 Cal 2d 453, where it was noted that privity should be abandoned and that the public policy 
considerations underlying the implied warranty of merchantability should be used to construct an 
independent and strict liability for defective products in tort. Further extension took place in 
Henningsen v Bloomfield Motors Inc 32 NJ 358, 161 A 2d 6 (1960). See, also, Loubser & Reid 
2012: 24; Stapleton 1994: 21. 
144 59 Cal 2d 57 (1963). 
145 Howells 2006: 579. 
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During this time, victims of defective consumer products in European 
jurisdictions generally had to seek refuge in the law of contract and tort law if they 
intended to seek compensation for their harm.147 In the UK, for example, Stapleton 
writes that “[l]ittle changed in the relevant UK common law from the removal of the 
privity barrier to tort claims for physical loss in Donoghue v Stevenson (1932) until 
the turn of the 1960s”.148 
A victim of a defective product could thus sue a retailer for the harm to his 
person or property under the warranties as to the quality of the product implied under 
the Sale of Goods Act.149 However, courts continued to give effect to the privity 
requirement in contract law, and a third party who suffered harm, regardless of the 
foreseeability thereof, was therefore not entitled to sue for breach of contract.150 
Further, consumers who intended to sue someone other than the immediate seller 
of the defective product, could do so only in the event that such a person had made 
an express warranty with regard to the quality of the product.151 Despite the House of 
Lord’s confirmation in Donoghue v Stevenson152 that the ultimate consumer had a tort 
claim against the ultimate manufacturer of the defective product, the plaintiff was 
still required to prove negligence.153 The end result therefore was that, compared to 
the developments initiated by US courts, victims of defective consumer products in 
the UK received considerably less protection against the risk of harm that 
manufactured products carried with them. 
The legal position was similar in Germany, where, prior to the legislature’s ultimate 
intervention in 1989,154 liability for harm arising from defective consumer products 
was regulated by tort and contract law.155 In 1956, the German Bundesgerichtshof156 
denied the driver of a new bicycle a remedy in tort when the handlebar broke because 
of the technical deficiency of the steel, resulting in the plaintiff’s bodily injuries. The 
court held that the weakness in the steel was practically undiscoverable and that the 
manufacturer had not breached its duty of care and was therefore not negligent. 
However, in 1968, the same court brought about a “fundamental change”157 when 
 
 
147 See, generally, Stapleton 1994: 37–45; Markesinis & Unberath 2002: 748–749, 881–883; Reimann 
 2015: 251–253. 
148 Stapleton 1994: 37. 
149 Ibid; Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 590. 
150 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 590. 
151 Stapleton 1994: 37–38. 
152 [1932] AC 562. 
153 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 590. 
154 The Products Liability Act, 1989. 
155 Grote 2008: 111. 
156 BGH VIZR 36/55 “Der Betriebˮ 1956 at 592. 









it held that, “if the cause of the damaging factor can only be located within the 
premises of the producer, his negligence is presumed”.158 
This judicial attempt at developing the law to assist the victim of a defective 
consumer product in finding compensation for his harm was borne out of 
considerations related to fairness: “It would be unjust for the victim … to be forced 
to prove circumstances within the enterprise which would only allow the conclusion 
that the producer was negligent. The factory of the manufacturer is not accessible to 
him. It is therefore the defendant who must show that he did not act negligently.”159 
This change in the legal position “was no doubt influenced by the developments in 
the USA … and the adoption of s 402A of the Restatement of Torts Second”.160 
Despite the judicial development to assist victims of defective products in 
claiming compensation, Taschner maintains that the German courts provided only 
“half-way solutions [which] showed the need to change the law, [and that] they were 
not definite ways to reach a satisfactory result”.161 Similarly, writing about European 
jurisdictions generally, Reimann states that the “courts in Western Europe struggled 
to protect victims of defective products without openly breaking with the traditional 
rules of contract … and tort”.162 
Dissatisfaction concerning the inability of existing liability regimes to provide 
redress for consumers therefore grew steadily.163 The concern was amplified by the 
thalidomide drug disaster of the 1960s. During 1961, it was recognised that the 
pregnancy drug, thalidomide, had caused birth defects in the children of some of its 
users. Almost 8 000 children in over 30 countries were affected.164 The difficulties 
that were experienced by the deformed children in obtaining compensation from the 
manufacturer assisted in focusing attention on the uncertainties and difficulties 
experienced when instituting a tort claim for negligence, as did the slow and 
expensive process of litigation.165 
Therefore, at the time that proposals for a European Community Directive on 
Products Liability were first considered in the 1970s, it was not possible to speak       of 
product liability law as such in either Germany  or England.166  In both countries,  the 
legislature intervened by adopting product liability legislation subsequent to the Member 
States of the European Community adoption of Council Directive 85/374/EEC on 25 
July 1985. The Directive had the “dual aim of harmonising the conditions of 
 
 
158 Taschner 2005: 155, 159. 
159 Idem at 159. See, also, Reimann 2015: 252. 
160 Fairgrieve 2005: 100. 
161 Taschner 2005: 159. 
162 Reimann 2015: 252. 
163 Loubser & Reid 2012: 9. 
164 Stapleton 1994: 42. 
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competition in the internal market and ensuring adequate protection for victims of 
unsafe products across the Member States”.167 Broadly, the directive provides that, 
where someone can prove that his bodily integrity or property has been physically 
harmed by a defective product that was put into circulation in the ordinary course of 
business, he can institute a claim against its manufacturer, importer, own-brand 
supplier or a mere supplier, without having to prove negligence against any specific 
party or that the defendant caused the defect.168 
In England, the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act of 1987 can be traced 
back to this directive and the Act seeks to give effect to its principles. Generally, this 
Act, as read with the directive, imposes strict liability on manufacturers, distributors 
and retailers for harm arising from defective products. Similarly, in Germany, the 
Products Liability Act of 1989 followed the 1985 Directive and introduced a strict 
liability on manufacturers for harm arising from defective products.169 
In contrast to the US, UK and German legislatures, the South African legislature 
took significantly longer before it finally decided to develop the delictual principles 
relating to harm suffered as a result of defective products. The CPA was enacted   in 
2008 and only became operative in 2010. Section 61(1) of the Act introduced     a 
framework in terms of which producers, importers, distributors or retailers may be 
held strictly liable for bodily injuries or property damage brought about by the supply 
of unsafe goods or by a product failure, defect or hazard, or by inadequate 
instructions or warnings for the use of certain goods. 
Prior to its enactment, however, the legal position was that a consumer who 
suffered harm as a result of a defective product could institute either a contractual 
claim against the seller of the product in question or, alternatively, pursue a delictual 
remedy against a member of the supply chain. The South African law of contract, 
however, did not undergo a similar development with regard to the extension of 
warranties, and consumers who pursued this route remained bound by the principle 
of privity of contract.170 In terms of the South African common law of contract, a 
manufacturer may be held liable to a purchaser for breach of warranty on the basis 
of agency or a contract for the benefit of a third party.171 However, these contractual 
mechanisms ultimately have limited practical effect in assisting consumers who have 
suffered harm as a result of a defective product against manufacturers.172 
On the other hand, a plaintiff who instituted a delictual claim173 is bound to prove 
all of the common-law elements for delictual liability. In the context of defective 
 
167 Loubser & Reid 2012: 9. 
168 See Stapleton 1994: 49. 
169 Markesinis & Unberath 2002: 748. 
170 Hutchison & Pretorius 2012: 21–32. See, also, Van Eeden 2013: 73–87, 372; Loubser & Reid 
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171 Loubser & Reid 2012: 24; Dendy 2014: par 175. 
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consumer products, the elements of fault (in the form of negligence), causation174 and 
fault175 are particularly difficult to prove. In Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v 
Pharmacare Ltd (Wagener),176 the SCA was requested to develop the common law 
of delict by doing away with the requirement of fault.177 However, the court refrained 
from doing so, stating that any reform of the law of delict in this context was better 
left to the legislature.178 
The apparent lack of an effective remedy to compensate harm suffered by a 
consumer may therefore be said to have been a convincing policy-based consideration 
for the legislative development of this branch of the law, both in South Africa and 
elsewhere. Of course, as stated above, a desire for an effective remedy was the result 
of the risk of harm consumers were exposed to by especially modernised, 
technologically-advanced manufacturers and the accompanying risk of potentially 
receiving no compensation should the harm materialise. 
The legislative development of the delictual remedies in respect of harm caused 
by defective consumer products occurred through the introduction of a strict liability 
regime for producers, importers, distributors and retailers. The most convincing 
policy-based justification for the legislature’s development of the law of delict may 
arguably be found in the notion of enterprise liability. Consumers are exposed to 
risks inherent to certain products from which manufacturers stand to make a profit. 
Therefore, the costs of accidents should be imposed on the manufacturers, who, 
additionally, often are best placed to take steps to avoid the risk of damage (by taking 
precautions at the design and manufacturing stages of production)179 or to minimise 
its effects (through the adoption of insurance or through pricing of products).180 This 
point has also been illustrated in the landmark US decision, Escola v Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co:181 
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility be fixed 
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health inherent in defective 
products that reach the market. It is evident that the manufacturer can anticipate some hazards 
and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public cannot. Those who suffer injury from 
defective products are unprepared to meet its consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss 
of time or health may be an overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless 
one, for the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public 
as a cost of doing business. It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products 
 
174 See idem at 53–55 for the difficulties relating to proving causation in this context. 
175 See idem at 46–50 for the difficulties relating to proving fault in this context. See, also, Wagener 
v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA). 
176 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) par 10. 
177 Idem pars 17, 27–30. 
178 See, also, part 2.5 infra. 
179 Deakin, Johnston & Markesinis 2013: 590–591. 
180 Loubser & Reid 1994: 5; Stapleton 1994: 162–184. 
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having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way 
into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever injury they 
may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture of the 
product, is responsible for its reaching the market. However intermittently such injuries may 
occur and however haphazardly they may strike, the risk of their occurrence is a constant 
risk and a general one. Against such a risk there should be general and constant protection 
and the manufacturer is best situated to afford such protection. 
In conclusion, it may be argued that, as was the case with statutory intervention in the 
area of motor vehicle accidents and workplace-related injuries and diseases, the most 
prominent underlying consideration for the development of the fault-based common 
law of delict in relation to harm suffered as a result of a defective product is the 
creation of a risk of harm and the additional risk that the injured consumer may not 
find compensation as a result of an insolvent manufacturer, evidentiary difficulties or 
ineffective legal remedies. The introduction of strict liability by the legislature has 
been justified by the notion of enterprise liability in the context of both occupational 
injuries and diseases, as well as defective consumer products.182 
At the advent of the previous century, the protection from the risk of potential 
harm was still largely assumed to be a matter that people had to attend to themselves. 
Upon the materialisation of such a risk, people were similarly presumed to take 
responsibility for obtaining compensation for their harm by instituting legal action 
against the wrongdoer.183 In other words, those who suffered harm as a result of the 
culpable wrongdoing of others were largely dependent on the remedies available in 
the common law of delict. Generally, this meant that the victims of harm had to find 
the time and funds to institute legal proceedings against a wrongdoer and provide 
sufficient evidentiary proof that the wrongdoer’s culpable conduct was indeed the 
cause of their harm. 
However, over the course of the twentieth century, a shift gradually occurred 
and the law of delict was developed by the South African legislature. The shift 
originated in the context of accidents that took place in the workplace, which may be 
said to have been characterised by an initial reluctance to regulate the behaviour of 
employers,184 and the court’s original individualistic approach, which saw employers 
being held liable for workplace accidents only in the event that the victim could 
prove personal fault on the part of the employer.185 The development of the law of 
delict, as driven by the South African legislature, ultimately led to a growing demand 
for workplace safety, legal certainty and, most importantly, a cheaper and quicker 
way of compensating employees who suffered harm when an employment-related 
risk of harm materialised. Although there were other compelling considerations, it 
 
182 See Stapleton 1994: 20. 
183 For a comparative perspective, see Hedley 2013: 235. 
184 Select Committee 1994: 64–65. See, also, Hedley 2013: 236. 









may be argued that, ultimately, the employees’ exposure to an ever-increasing risk of 
harm and the accompanying risk of not being able to receive compensation provided 
the predominant consideration for the legislature’s decision to intervene. 
Similarly, as a result of the increase in the number of motor vehicles during the 
course of the twentieth century, the number and frequency of motor vehicle accidents 
grew significantly. Perhaps more than occupational accidents, this upsurge exposed 
road users to a substantial risk of harm and an accompanying risk of receiving no 
compensation in the event that the risk should materialise. Again, the legislature 
intervened by developing the law of delict. This was initially done by retaining the 
motor vehicle accident victim’s delictual remedy against a wrongdoer while also 
introducing the notion of compulsory third party insurance.186 In doing so, the 
legislature shifted the responsibility to compensate the motor vehicle accident victim 
to a source other than the wrongdoer. The legislature’s desire to address the risk of 
receiving no compensation also saw it further develop the law relating to motor 
vehicle accidents by replacing the system of compulsory third-party insurance with 
a centralised compensation fund, financed through fuel levies. 
Recently, the legislature abolished the motor vehicle accident victim’s right to a 
common-law delictual remedy in respect of the harm not covered by the RAF Act. 
Although such a legislative development was held to be constitutionally valid, it 
arguably undermines the initial legislative project of ensuring the compensation of 
the victim’s harm in the case of a risk eventuating, and is furthermore indicative of 
the legislature’s attempt to offer protection also to the wrongdoer. The legislature has 
attempted to justify these amendments as constituting part of greater reform towards 
a comprehensive social security for all individuals. 
The statutory development of the law of delict by the introduction of a strict 
liability regime in respect of producers, importers, distributors or retailers was also, 
to a great extent, driven by the dramatic increase in the production of consumer 
goods, which brought about an ever-increasing risk of harm associated with a 
modern, mechanised society that produces potentially hazardous products. 
Although the utility of motor vehicle transport, increased labour forces and      a 
growing manufacturing sector is clearly visible, the benefit is accompanied by   an 
amplified risk of harm. The South African legal system produced a solution in which 
these activities was permitted, but only on condition that the most appropriate 
enterprise was saddled with the cost of the risks they produced.187 
Attention has already been drawn to the expansion of the state’s delictual liability 
for harm that arises from crime.188 The development is disquieting, also from a crime- 
prevention perspective because, with more of available tax-payer funds being spent 
 
186 Idem at 243: “Third-party insurance was first offered to carriage drivers in 1875, and to motorists 
in 1896.” Furthermore, compulsory insurance was introduced by the Road Traffic (Compensation 
for Accidents) Bill in 1934. 
187 See, also, Markesinis & Unberath 2002: 716. 
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on litigation and the payment of full compensation to crime victims, less of the funds 
are directed to promoting safety and to preventing crime. In turn, this creates greater 
possibilities for the further extension of the state’s delictual liability. In other words, 
the current judicial trend indirectly contributes to the increased risk of crime by 
diminishing available resources intended for crime prevention. At the same time, the 
recent development responds to the risk of receiving no or limited compensation in 
the event of suffering from crime – but only in respect of a limited number of crime 
victims who are able to institute litigious proceedings against the state. Therefore, 
the ongoing tendency to expand the state’s delictual liability indirectly contributes to 
the increased likelihood of being a victim of crime, while it provides a compensatory 
solution only to those who are capable of proving liability in court. 
Viewed  against the background of statutory development, which highlights  the 
potentially more effective victim compensation strategy that exists through the 
legislative reform of the law of delict, the current judicial development pertaining to 
crime victim compensation appears unattractive.189 
 
2   2 The role of the Constitution and the need to promote the 
constitutional right to social security 
In this part of the contribution, attention will be given to the role of the Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (Constitution) in justifying the statutory 
development of the law of delict. As discussed in greater detail below, the statutory 
development of the law of delict is examined to establish the role that the constitutional 
right to social security has fulfilled as a legal consideration justifying the legislative 
intervention in the law of delict. Particular attention is given to the development of 
the area of the law that relates to motor vehicle accidents and occupational injuries 
and diseases. 
Before continuing, it would be appropriate to summarise the salient provisions of 
the Constitution and to explain how this consideration differs from the one discussed 
in part 2.1 above. The Constitution is the supreme law of the country,190 central to the 
country’s legal system and it determines the validity of all law, including the law of 
delict. The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state.191 It also applies to the conduct of natural persons 
and juristic persons, when appropriate.192 The Constitution also enjoins every court, 
tribunal or forum to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when 
 
189 Some of the negative aspects related to the expansion of state delictual liability for harm arising 
from crime has been highlighted in the introduction to this contribution – see part 1 supra. In this 
regard, see Wessels 2018: 31–127 for a thorough discussion of that development. 
190 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
191 Idem s 8(1). 









interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law.193 Section 7(2) of 
the Constitution imposes upon the state a positive duty to protect and promote the 
rights contained in the Bill of Rights. Importantly, section 27(1)(c)194 refers to the 
right to social security and section 27(2)195 imposes upon the state a mandatory duty 
to take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to 
achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights. 
Further, the promotion of social security as a policy consideration should be 
distinguished from the need to combat risk.196 The promotion of social security is not 
only focused on addressing the risk of a specific type of harm and the accompanying 
risk of potentially receiving no or limited compensation. Legislation that is aimed at 
promoting social security typically casts the net wider and attempts to support 
individuals with no or low income, to provide adequate standard of living and to put 
in place a social safety net against destitution.197 As alluded to in its policy paper 
regarding the proposed RABS, the right to a social security system does not focus 
only on compensating harm that arises within a specific context.198 Instead, social 
security arrangements consist of a range of collective and individual social, fiscal, 
occupational and welfare measures of private, public and mixed origin, aimed at 
providing social cover to members of society.199 In other words, the consideration 
discussed in this part of the contribution is not the same as the one discussed in  part 
2.1 above. While the latter concentrated solely on the issue of compensation  of the 
victim’s harm (once a particular risk has materialised), the promotion of the 
constitutional right to social security has a broader scope that embraces other non- 
compensatory objectives, including empowering the historically disadvantaged,200 
promoting fundamental human rights (particularly human dignity),201 addressing past 
injuries202 and seeking to provide an adequate standard of life to all individuals.203 
 
193 Idem s 39(2). 
194 This section states that everyone has the right to access to “social security, including, if they are 
unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social assistance”. 
195 This section states that the “state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its 
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights”. 
196 See, also, part 2.1 supra. 
197 Department of Transport 2011: 7–8. 
198 Idem at 5–6. 
199 Ibid. 
200 In doing so, the legislation addresses poverty and social exclusion, which may be regarded as     a 
key to social protection. It also enhances other constitutional values and principles, such as 
equality, non-sexism and non-racism. See Olivier, Smit & Kalula 2003: 35. 
201 Idem at 36: “There is some Constitutional Court authority for the view that social security-related 
rights are aimed at more than simply restoring material disadvantage. In Grootboom, the court 
emphasised the strong link between human dignity and the giving effect to access of adequate 
housing.” 
202 Idem at 53: “Fundamental reform of South Africa’s social security system aims to redress past 
injustices, particularly the country’s legacy of poverty and equality.” 
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Referring to the statutory motor vehicle accident compensation scheme 
established to cover the risks to which road users are exposed, the Constitutional 
Court held that it “seems plain that the scheme arose out of the social responsibility 
of the State. In effect, it was, and indeed still remains, part of the social security net 
for all road users and their dependants”.204 
During the parliamentary debate concerning the introduction of the 1942 Act 
and accompanying compulsory third party insurance scheme, it was stressed that, 
regardless of the accompanying cost that a compulsory third-party insurance system 
may bring, members of society should realise that the Act “aims at the protection of 
those who cannot look after themselves”.205 In particular, the “principle of security”206 
was emphasised to ensure protection of the road users’ interests and safety. Those in 
favour of the legislation stressed the impact of injury and disability upon road 
users:207 
Those people who were injured are suffering day in and day out in their work; they are unable 
to look after their families, and because those families have to endure great hardships while 
the children are young, they cannot enjoy their legitimate share in life. Those are the people 
we should primarily think of. They must be looked after. The people who are injured must 
first of all be nursed back to health, which means an enormous amount of work for the 
hospitals and for the nursing services, and also for the medical services of this country. 
Because of its adherence to fault-based liability, the RAF Act, however, has been 
criticised as a failed system that is “unreasonable, inequitable, unaffordable and 
unsustainable”.208 As discussed elsewhere in this contribution,209 the requirement for 
fault has a significantly detrimental impact on the successful pursuit of compensation 
by a motor vehicle accident victim. In turn, it is argued, a significant amount of those 
victims are left uncompensated and without the ability to earn income. To deal with 
this concern, and to provide greater effect to the right to social security, the legislature 
has proposed the RABS. In Law Society of South Africa v Minister for Transport,210 
the purpose of the proposed scheme was described as follows: 
[T]he ultimate vision is that the new system of compensation for road accident victims must 
be integrated into a comprehensive social security system that offers life, disability and health 
insurance cover for all accidents and diseases. [The Minister] acknowledges that a fault-
based common-law system of compensation for road accident victims would be at odds with 
a comprehensive social security model. The intention is therefore to replace the common-
law system of compensation with a set of limited no-fault benefits which would 
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form part of a broader social security net as public financial support for people who are poor, 
have a disability or are vulnerable. … [The] new scheme is a first step to greater reform. 
Furthermore, the policy paper for the RABS makes it clear that the proposed no-fault 
based compensatory scheme must be understood against the social and economic 
reality of South African society, which is characterised by great disproportions in 
income and lifestyle.211 The RABS is cognisant of historical disadvantages prevalent 
in the South African society and is a legislative attempt to develop the existing 
common law of delict as it relates to compensation of motor vehicle accidents, as 
well as an attempt to contribute to the state’s broader social security reform process.212 
By removing the requirement of fault, the legislature makes provision that social 
security benefits will be made available to a wider group of road accident victims,213 
in the process seeking to provide an adequate standard of life to all citizens. In doing 
so, the legislature strives to promote the principle of social inclusion, as well as the 
notion that the “risk of misfortune should become the comprehensive and collective 
responsibility of society as a whole”.214 
Occupational-injury-and-disease schemes are generally considered to be the 
oldest form of social security coverage in the world.215 It is also regarded as the most 
widespread system of social security, and if the “various branches of social security 
from different countries are examined it is clear that almost every country … has an 
insurance scheme to cover these risks”.216 Generally, these schemes give effect to the 
right to social security by promoting workplace safety and providing compensation, 
medical care, vocational rehabilitation, and further benefits to employees, as well as 
survivors’ benefits for families of victims of occupational accidents.217 
As noted above, COIDA introduced significant changes in respect of the 
protection of employees’ rights and, although it did not intend to provide a kind of 
general health cover for every accident or disease which an employee may suffer from, 
it may nevertheless be regarded as social security legislation, aimed at the provision 
of a more equitable compensation dispensation in regard to injuries suffered and 
diseases contracted by employees.218 Specifically, where earlier legislation was based 
on the principle of individual employer liability as covered by private insurance, the 
subsequent legislation introduced the principle of no-fault based liability and limited 
benefits covered by a public scheme.219 The introduction of such a scheme, which 
does not require an employee to prove fault on the part of the employer, weakens 
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the likelihood of lengthy and costly legal disputes and provides a more streamlined 
administrative process for the effective compensation of injured employees. As such, 
this piece of “social legislation”220 promotes the social and economic welfare of 
employees. 
Therefore, taking into account that it sought to promote workplace safety, 
rehabilitate injured or diseased employees and provide compensation to those who 
have fallen victim to accidents that have occurred during the course and scope of 
employment, it may be said that the legislative development of a no-fault-based 
compensation scheme for occupational injuries and diseases in South Africa is an 
example of the promotion of the constitutional right to social security.221 
In conclusion, it may be said that social security arrangements consist of a range 
of collective and individual social, fiscal, occupational and welfare measures of 
private, public and mixed origin, aimed at providing social cover to members   of 
society and at combating certain risks. The statutory compensation schemes   that 
provide compensation for harm arising from motor vehicle accidents and 
occupational injuries and diseases constitute a part of the broader social security 
project in South Africa. These schemes afford a variety of victims the possibility   to 
obtain compensation in a relatively affordable and quick manner and without having 
to pursue a more costly, time-consuming litigious route. In doing so, they protect 
people from misfortune, distress and the significant risks to life caused by 
unemployment, illness, injury, disability and death of a breadwinner, and thereby 
give effect to the constitutional right to social security. 
The Constitution has been particularly important in developing the law of delict 
by promoting the constitutional right to social security. It may be argued that COIDA 
and the RAF Act are aimed at giving effect to this constitutional imperative insofar 
as they afford victims of motor vehicle accidents, workplace injuries and diseases the 
fullest possible protection of their legal interests.222 Furthermore, the proposed no-
fault-based compensatory model sought to be introduced under the RABS has 
pertinently been justified on the basis that it seeks to give “effect to the [right to] 
reasonable access to social security and health care”.223 
The South African legislature’s development of the law of delict pertaining to 
the compensation of accident victims is therefore justified insofar as it addresses 
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particular and pervasive social risks to which all members of society are exposed and 
responds to the broader constitutional project to promote social security. 
 
2   3 Evidentiary problems with applying the common-law 
requirement of fault 
Although the law of delict recognises exceptional circumstances where it is not 
required, a plaintiff must, generally, prove fault. This means that, first, the victim  is 
required to prove that the wrongdoer had the capacity to be at fault.224  To  do    so, a 
plaintiff must prove that the defendant had the mental ability to distinguish between 
right and wrong and to act in accordance with that distinction.225 If the wrongdoer is 
shown to be accountable, the plaintiff must prove that the wrongdoer acted either 
intentionally or negligently. With regard to the former, it must be proven that the 
defendant had the direction of will to cause him harm and that the wrongdoer was 
conscious of the wrongfulness of his act.226 In respect of the latter, the plaintiff must 
prove that the wrongdoer’s conduct failed to measure up to the standard of the 
objective reasonable person.227 
Despite strong arguments that may be raised in support of the departure from 
fault-based liability, the South African courts have reiterated the requirement for 
proving fault when establishing delictual liability.228 Despite  the  fact that there 
may be convincing reasons in favour of such a general position, the South African 
legislature has nevertheless elected to develop the law of delict by abolishing the 
fault requirement in specific contexts. In this part of the contribution, consideration is 
given to the reasons that have justified the legislative development in these instances. 
In its report, the RAFC, tasked with conducting an inquiry into and making 
recommendations regarding a “reasonable, equitable, affordable and sustainable 
system for the payment by the Road Accident Fund of compensation or benefits 
in the event of the injury or death of persons in road accidents in the Republic”,229 
noted that it “is increasingly felt that fault cannot really be determined accurately and 
there is also a growing social concern for accident victims regardless of the role they 
played in causing the accident”.230 
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In the RABS policy paper dealing with the potential legislative intervention in 
the law of delict in the context of motor vehicle accidents, the Minister states that 
this requirement may lead to a delay in providing victim compensation, because it is 
often necessary to resort to litigation to obtain clarity on the question of fault.231 This, 
in turn, results in extensive legal costs for both the accident victim and the RAF.232 
During the delay, victims have to pay for medical and other expenses themselves 
and, if they are disabled, they are not in a position to pursue gainful employment, 
which means that their families could also suffer.233 In a developing country, such as 
South Africa, “a significant proportion of road users have not had the financial means 
to pay for appropriate healthcare and rehabilitation themselves while waiting for the 
legal process to be finalised”.234 For these reasons, the fault-based system of liability 
under the RAF Act has been described as “unreasonable, inequitable, unaffordable 
and unsustainable”.235 
In response to these difficulties, the RABS has been proposed. The preamble  of 
the proposed legislation for motor vehicle accidents therefore states that “there  is a 
need to expand and facilitate access to benefits by providing them on a no- fault 
basis”. The suggested no-fault model under the RABS will potentially ease the 
“administrative load … and speed up service delivery. Long delays in the settlement 
of claims will be eliminated by the fact that possible disputes over the fault 
requirement and which frequently required legal intervention will be removed and 
by the resulting streamlined administrative process”.236 
The proposal of a no-fault liability model under the proposed RABS provides 
an example of where the evidentiary difficulties in proving fault (in the form of 
negligence) has been used as a justifiable policy reason for legislative reform of  the 
law of delict.237 It is envisaged that the proposed no-fault model will ease the 
administrative load regarding the process of statutory claims, increase the speed with 
which those claims are processed and prevent lengthy, costly legal disputes 
concerning the existence of negligence. 
The introduction of a strict liability regime in the context of occupational injuries 
and diseases was similarly motivated by the desire to assist the victims of 
occupational injuries and diseases so that they are not required to prove fault.238 
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Upon tabling COIDA to the extended public committee in parliament, the Minister 
of Manpower aptly remarked:239 
Under common law an injured employee or the dependents of a deceased employee may get 
compensation from his employer if it can be proved that the injury or death was due to the 
negligence of the employer, but in a modern industrial set-up in which, for example, a 
number of employees jointly use sophisticated machinery, it may be virtually impossible for 
an injured employee to prove negligence. 
With the introduction of COIDA and by doing away with proving fault within this 
context, the employee is therefore able to obtain compensation from a solvent entity 
much easier and quicker.240 It may therefore be argued that the compensation fund 
more effectively compensates victims than a delict/tort system that requires proof of 
fault.241 
Proving fault, especially negligence, is difficult and places a burden on the 
plaintiff that is often hard or impossible to discharge.242 This evidentiary difficulty 
has been a major policy consideration in favour of statutory intervention in the field 
of product liability, where the consumer is usually unable to analyse or scrutinise the 
products for safety.243 In Wagener, the SCA was requested to develop the rules of the 
common law of delict so that it was no longer required for victims of defective 
products to prove that the manufacturer had been culpable (in this case, negligent) in 
manufacturing the product in question. Although the court ultimately opted to leave 
the development of this branch of the law to the legislature, it took cognisance of the 
difficulty in proving fault:244 
A plaintiff has no knowledge of, or access to the manufacturing process, either to determine 
its workings generally or, more particularly, to establish negligence in relation to the making 
of the item or substance which has apparently caused the injury complained of. And, contrary 
to what some writers suggest, it was urged that it is insufficient to overcome the problem that 
the fact of the injury, consequent upon use of the product as prescribed or directed, brings 
the maxim res ipsa loquitur into play and casts on the defendant a duty to lead evidence or 
risk having judgment given against it. The submission is that resort to the maxim is but a 
hypocritical ruse to justify (unwarranted) adherence to the fault requirement. 
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A by-product of a strict liability regime in this context is the fact that it assists in 
promoting consumer safety and deterring the manufacturing of dangerous products. 
In the product liability context, the abolition of the fault requirement appears to 
perform the instrumental function of creating safety incentives.245 Imposing strict 
liability on manufacturers for harm caused by manufacturing defects encourages 
greater investment in product safety than does a regime of fault-based liability under 
which sellers may escape their appropriate share of responsibility.246 In its 1985 
Directive, the European Union also emphasised the fact that the imposition of a strict 
liability regime relating to defective products is the “sole means of adequately solving 
the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair apportionment of 
the risks inherent in modern technological production”.247 
These considerations have prompted the South African legislature to shift the 
harm suffered by consumers due to defective products onto the risk creator who 
directly stands to benefit from the risk-taking.248 The introduction by the South 
African legislature of the strict liability regime for defective products under section 
61(1) of the CPA practically assists consumers in protecting their legal interests in 
cases involving complex products and where it would otherwise have been difficult 
or impossible to attain expert evidence to prove the defendant’s fault.249 
In conclusion, it may be said that the argument against fault (especially in the 
form of negligence) has been successful in both South Africa and foreign jurisdictions 
in spurring legislative development of the law of delict/tort in a variety of contexts, 
notably harm resulting from defective consumer products, workplace-related injuries 
and diseases and motor vehicle accidents.250 It is submitted that the requirement to 
prove fault, especially negligence, in some instances may place a burden on victims 
of harm that is very difficult, or potentially impossible to satisfy, thereby potentially 
leaving them without compensation. 
 
2   4 The nature of the civil litigation process: 
Under-compensation and high transaction costs 
From a comparative perspective, the common law of tort has been criticised as being 
ineffective in its principal aim of compensating harm resulting from especially 
personal injury, disease and death.251 Dissatisfaction with the operation of the tort 
system received widespread academic attention during the 1960s and 1970s.252 
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During the same time, mass tort litigation drew public attention to the clumsy, time-
consuming and costly nature of obtaining compensation by instituting civil 
proceedings.253 
The vigorous academic and public debates in the UK about the shortcomings of 
the tort system as a compensation mechanism was further buoyed by the enactment 
of the Accident Compensation Act in New Zealand in 1972.254 The Act abolished the 
tort system insofar as the compensation for harm resulting from personal injuries is 
concerned, and replaced it with a general compensation scheme that provided 
compensation for harm resulting from all accidents and some diseases.255 It was 
argued that such a legislative development would, inter alia, alleviate the concerns 
relating to the high transaction costs of the civil litigation system. Within this 
framework, the UK government established the Royal Commission on Civil Liability 
and Compensation for Personal Injury to investigate the need for reform of the 
common law of tort (Pearson Report).256 
The Pearson Report revealed that out of the total number of some 3 million 
persons estimated to have suffered from personal injury each year, only approximately 
1,7 million received financial assistance from any source, with some of the victims 
receiving compensation from more than one  source.257  Significantly,  it  was  found 
that:258 
[Out of the] estimated 3 million persons suffering some injury in each year, only some 
125,000 (approximately 7 per cent) received any compensation in the form of tort damages. 
However, the total value of the damages paid to this 7 per cent was almost half of the total 
value of the social security payments made to the 1.5 million recipients of those payments. 
When account is taken of the administrative costs of the differing compensation systems, the 
position is even more striking, because the tort system is much more expensive to administer 
… of the total cost of compensation paid (on average in each of the years 1971–1976) some 
£1 billion, the tort system accounted for no less than £377 million. Thus, 7 per cent of     the 
accident victims accounted for perhaps 37 per cent of the total cost (payments plus 
administration) of the compensation paid out (making some allowance for the estimated 
administrative costs). 
The Pearson Report indicated the high costs associated with the tort system which, in 
relation to other sources of compensation, seemed “less significant if its importance 
is assessed not in relation to accident victims alone, but in relation to the tentimes 
larger group of people who are disabled from all causes, these predominantly being 
illness and disease”.259 
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Although there are no up-to-date statistics to put alongside those provided in the 
Pearson Commission’s report, it has been argued that “there is little reason to think 
that the basic picture is significantly different now”.260 In addition, it has been stated 
that, although “[f]igures for South Africa are not known, they are likely to show 
similar trends”.261 
In the South African context, it may be argued that, similar to the position in 
England262 and elsewhere,263 civil litigation is expensive264 and only a limited number 
of plaintiffs can afford the accompanying legal transaction costs,265 thereby restricting 
the right of general access to justice.266 Legal costs and fees in South Africa are 
substantial, leading some to argue that “the major barrier to access to justice in South 
Africa remains the high cost of legal services”.267 It is therefore unsurprising that in 
EFF v Speaker of the National Assembly; DA v Speaker of the National Assembly,268 
Mogoeng CJ recently emphasised the fact that “[l]itigation is prohibitively expensive 
and therefore not an easily exercisable constitutional option for an average citizen”. 
To illustrate, in 2005, the average South African household would have had to 
use a week’s income to afford a one-hour consultation with an average attorney.269 
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More recently, in 2013, it was recorded that “clients with a monthly income of R600 
… are frequently charged fees in the region of R1 500 … just for an initial 
consultation”.270 In accordance with the Rules Board for Courts of Law Act 107 of 
1985, a 15-minute consultation may cost anything between R144 and R235, while 
the cost of drafting one page of a legal document may be charged at R50.271 It also 
restricts access to justice for the poor, especially civil justice, which is largely not 
available from Legal Aid South Africa.272 These fees restrict access to justice across 
the board for the not-so-poor, for instance persons in a household earning over R6 
000 a month and thus not qualifying for Legal Aid.273 
There are additional factors that may contribute towards the high cost of 
instituting a civil claim in a South African court. There are approximately 26 000 legal 
practitioners in South Africa, serving at least 53 million people.274 However, around 
2 500 of these practitioners are advocates who rarely have direct interaction with 
clients, especially poor ones. Furthermore, the vast majority of these practitioners 
are situated in the urban areas, with relatively few practising in small towns or rural 
areas, which means that “the cost and distance required to physically access lawyers 
makes pursuing litigation an overwhelmingly impractical option”.275 
Although the number of legal practitioners continues to grow,  it has not led   to 
greater competition, lower fees, more affordable legal assistance and greater access 
to justice.276 In addition, as noted above, the civil litigation process is time- 
consuming, resulting in many plaintiffs electing not to institute their claims at  all.277 
As a result, taking into account the high cost and time-consuming nature of litigation 
in this regard, private insurance has assumed an increasingly important role, relieving 
victims of loss of their financial burden.278 However, considering the levels of 
poverty in South Africa, the vast majority of citizens are probably not in a position 
to afford insurance. 
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The concern over the costly and time-consuming nature of civil proceedings   is 
not new to the South African legal landscape. In its Report on Compensation to 
Workmen in 1904, the Select Committee already took note of the problems raised by 
employees that the litigation process “has undoubtedly lengthened the time between 
the occurring of the accident and the receiving of the compensation”279 and that the 
proposed Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1905 had to provide compensation “to 
poor men quickly, and as cheaply as possible”.280 The same sentiment was echoed 
when the legislature decided to introduce a no-fault based compensatory system  for 
occupational injuries and diseases via COIDA: “In exchange for [forfeiting his 
common-law claim against his employer, the employee] gets an immediate remedy 
in the form of a statutory right to compensation without having to prove negligence 
on the part of the employer.”281 
In its judgement relating to the constitutionality of the abolition of the motor 
vehicle accident victim’s common-law claim against a wrongdoer in Law Society of 
South Africa v Minister for Transport,282 the Constitutional Court commented on the 
nature of the civil litigation process: 
The right of recourse under the common law proved to be of limited avail. The system of 
recovery was individualistic, slow, expensive and often led to uncertain outcomes. In many 
instances, successful claimants were unable to receive compensation from wrongdoers who 
had no means to make good their debts. On the other hand, it exposed drivers of motor 
vehicles to grave financial risk. 
The legislature has aimed to remedy this concern by, among other things, introducing 
a no-fault basis for compensation of harm arising from motor vehicle accidents. 
Furthermore, as the preamble to the proposed  RABS  indicates,  the  legislature has 
identified the “need to simplify claims procedures, reduce disputes and create 
certainty by providing defined and structured benefits … and there is a need to 
establish administrative procedures for the expeditious resolution of disputes that 
may arise and to alleviate the burden on the courts”. 
Lastly, the time-consuming nature and high transaction costs characteristic of 
the civil litigation process was also taken into account when drafting the provisions 
of the CPA that relate to its regulatory framework and access of justice.283  With   the 
introduction of the CPA, the legislature has changed not only the substantive law 
relating to defective consumer products, but it also effected changes to the 
administration of justice insofar as the adjudication of consumer rights and  disputes 
involving consumers and business are  concerned.  For  example, under the new 
regulatory framework, the National Consumer Tribunal (NCT) and the 
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National Consumer Commission (NCC) have important roles.284  While the NCT   is 
an adjudicative body, empowered to adjudicate on applications and allegations  of 
prohibited practice,285 the NCC is primarily an investigative body that aims to enforce 
the provisions by the Consumer Protection Act (CPA).286 The establishment of these 
bodies, as well as consumer courts, may be regarded as a response to the need for a 
cheaper, speedier, more flexible and informal regulatory system.287 
It is argued that the nature of the civil litigation process, notably its potential 
under-compensation of harm and the accompanying high transaction costs, has 
played a significant role in justifying the legislative reform of the law of delict in the 
areas where the need for this type of reform is most pressing and where the effect of 
reform can be most widespread and cost effective. 
 
2   5 The ability of the legislature to regulate liability more 
comprehensively than the judiciary 
Another consideration that have justified the statutory development of the law of 
delict is the ability of the legislature to regulate liability more comprehensively than 
the judiciary. In Wagener, the Supreme Court of Appeal took account of the debate 
surrounding the potential introduction of a strict liability regime for harm caused by 
defective consumer products. The court noted that product liability reform in foreign 
jurisdictions had largely been achieved through legislation and ultimately concluded 
that South Africa should adopt the same route: “If strict liability is to be imposed,  it 
is the Legislature that must do it.”288 In its judgement, it held that the legislature was 
better equipped to investigate the variety of questions that would have to be answered 
prior to introducing a strict liability regime in the context of defective products:289 
1. What products should be included … when it comes to determining the extent of the 
liability? 2. Is a manufacturer to include X, the maker of a component that is part of the whole 
article manufactured by Y; and which is liable if the component is defective? 3. Does 
 
284 See s 69 of the CPA. 
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compliant notices and make referrals to the NCC. In practice, however, many of these functions 
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defect mean defect in the making process only or,  in the case of a designed article, also      a 
defect of design? Should it include the failure, adequately or at all, to warn of possible 
harmful results? 4. Should the liability be confined to products intended for marketing 
without inspection or extend even to cases where the manufacturer does, or is legally obliged 
to, exercise strict quality  control?  5.  What  relevance  should  the  packaging  have – should 
liability, for example, be limited to cases where the packaging precludes intermediate 
examination or extend to cases where the manufacturer stipulates that a right such as a 
guarantee would be forfeited if intermediate examination were made? 6. Is a product 
defective if used innocuously on its own, but which causes damage when used in combination 
with another’s product? 7. What defences should be available? … 8. Should the damages 
recoverable be exactly the same as in the case of the Aquilian claim or should they be limited, 
as in some jurisdictions, by excluding pure economic loss or by limiting them to personal 
injury? 
 
The court held that single instances of litigation could not provide the opportunity 
for conducting the thorough investigation, analysis and determination that was 
necessary to produce a cohesive and effective structure by which to impose strict 
liability.290 The court’s recommendation was ultimately heeded and the legislature, 
with the benefit of more empirical data, time and product liability expertise, enacted 
the CPA.291 
In addition to the CPA, COIDA and the RAF Act are further examples of where 
the legislature reformed major areas of the law of delict. The enactment of these 
statutes enabled major legislative reform of the law of delict, as opposed to 
incremental judicial development of an element of delictual liability. It is submitted 
that, whenever large-scale development of a specific area within the law of delict 
may be required by specific policy-based considerations as those discussed in parts 
2.1–2.3 above, it appears more appropriate to follow the legislative route. Indeed, this 
much was also recognised by the Constitutional Court, which stated as follows:292 
In exercising their powers to develop the common law, Judges should be mindful of the  fact 
that the major engine for law reform should be the Legislature and not the Judiciary. In this 
regard it is worth repeating the following dictum … “Judges can and should adapt the 
common law to reflect the changing social, moral and economic fabric of the country. Judges 
should not be quick to perpetuate rules whose social foundation has long since disappeared. 
Nonetheless there are significant constraints on the power of the Judiciary to change the law. 
… In a constitutional democracy such as ours it is the Legislature and not the courts which 
has the major responsibility for law reform. … The Judiciary should confine itself to those 
incremental changes which are necessary to keep the common law in step with the dynamic 
and evolving fabric of our societyˮ. 
 
290 Ibid. 
291 From a comparative perspective, see, also, Cambridge Water Co v Eastern Counties Leather plc 
[1994] 2 AC 264 at 305: “I incline to the opinion that, as a general rule, it is more appropriate for 
strict liability in respect of operations of high risk to be imposed by Parliament, than by     the 
courts.” 









2   6 The need to avoid arbitrary outcomes 
In Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Roads Agency Ltd,293 Brand JA 
reaffirmed the fact that any “legal system in which the outcome of litigation cannot be 
predicted with some measure of certainty would fail in its purpose … . We therefore 
strive for certainty”. This part prompts us to consider how the need to avoid arbitrary 
outcomes in litigation, and thus to ensure legal certainty, could motivate law makers 
to develop the law of delict (or in common-law parlance, tort law). 
Scholars have argued that the tort system is essentially a “lottery”294 and that it 
“produces arbitrary outcomes”.295 Sugarman summarises this argument as follows: 
[W]hat count considerably are: the talents of the lawyer one happens to have; the tenacity of 
the defendant (or insurance adjuster) one happens to be up against; whether the defendant 
happens to be a motorist, a company, or a governmental entity; how attractive (but not too 
attractive) and how well spoken (but perhaps not too well spoken) the claimant happens to 
be; what race the claimant is; what state and community the victim lives in; how well one  is 
able to hold out for a larger settlement; the whim of the jury if the case gets that far; and 
whether one is lucky enough to have available the right sort of witnesses or other evidence 
of the injury and the defendant’s wrongdoing. In short, our current tort system is not a system 
of justice; it is a lottery. 
From this perspective, the imposition of tortious (or in our case, delictual) liability 
and the payment of damages are impacted on by considerations unrelated to what the 
parties deserve.296 The outcome of litigation may be substantially determined by 
contingent factors, including the availability of evidence, the quality of counsel, the 
limits of insurance coverage, the financing of litigation, the whims of judges (and, in 
common-law jurisdictions, juries), and many other factors that are not conducive to 
the consistent and principled application of law.297 
The argument that the tort system is unfair and unpredictable has been advanced 
to justify reform proposals in some way or the other. For example, in New Zealand, 
these arguments eventually won the day and secured the development of the law 
relating to the compensation of personal injuries arising from accidents. In its 1967 
report, the Royal Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury    in 
New Zealand asserted that “[t]he toll of personal injury is one of the disastrous 
incidents of social progress”.298 The Commission identified a number of weaknesses 
with the mechanisms available for dealing with personal injury, including particular 
 
293 2009 (2) SA 150 (SCA) pars 16–17. 
294 Sugarman 1987: 796. 
295 Franklin 1967: 774: “[T]he fault system is little more than an immoral lottery for both plaintiffs 
and defendants.” See, also, Atiyah 1996: 143. 
296 Lytton, Rabin & Schuck 2010: 269. 
297 Idem at 268–269. 
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problems with tort law. One of the problems with tort law in cases of personal injury 
included “the difficulty of establishing liability for loss and of attaching a monetary 
value to that loss, resulting in the law being seen as, at best, uncertain and in some 
cases arbitrary and capricious”.299 Eventually, the legislature introduced the Accident 
Compensation Act in New Zealand in 1972, thereby abolishing the tort claim for 
harm arising from accidents. 
Arguably, the statutory development of the law of delict by the CPA, COIDA 
and the RAF Act has been motivated by similar considerations. For instance, with 
regard to the introduction of a strict liability regime for defective consumer products, 
the Supreme Court of Appeal implied that such a development should be driven by 
the legislature, because it could provide a more principled, logical and fair solution 
for the particular problem.300 
Furthermore, in line with the arguments raised in foreign jurisdictions, the 
statutory development of COIDA and the RAF Act (and the proposed RABS) 
appears to be motivated by the general consideration to ensure that the outcome of 
litigation is not influenced by the contingent factors mentioned above. After all, the 
likelihood of a victim receiving compensation under those statutes is not dependent 
on the quality of counsel, the limits of insurance coverage, the financing of litigation, 
or the whims of a particular judge. 
 
3 Conclusion 
The legal position surrounding crime victim compensation may be described as 
unsatisfactory.301 As indicated in the introduction to this contribution, the current 
compensatory regime is characterised by various theoretical and practical problems. 
From a practical and financial perspective, the continued state delictual liability for 
harm arising from crime means that more and more taxpayer funds, which were 
earmarked to be used in crime prevention campaigns, are used to satisfy civil claims. 
If this trend continues, less money will be available for combating crime, resulting 
in more litigation against the state. Ultimately, this cycle of ever-expanding state 
delictual liability threatens the state’s ability to combat crime and to comply with its 
constitutional obligations to protect its citizens. From a theoretical point of view, the 
expansion of state delictual liability is problematic, not the least because it may 
produce uncertainty and arbitrary outcomes in future litigation.302 
 
299 Ibid. 
300 Wagener v Pharmacare Ltd; Cuttings v Pharmacare Ltd 2003 (4) SA 285 (SCA) pars 28–31. 
301 See, generally, Wessels 2018: 31–127. 
302 A full and thorough analysis of the theoretical concerns associated with this development falls 
well outside the scope of this contribution. However, see the comments made in part 1 supra, as 









Against this background, it may be considered whether there is an alternative 
method to provide compensation for crime victims. One particular alternative that has 
been adopted in a variety of foreign jurisdictions is the establishment of a statutory 
compensation fund for crime victims. Should such an alternative be adopted by the 
South African legislature, it will amount to the statutory development of the law   of 
delict insofar as the compensation of a specific group of victims is concerned. 
However, for the reasons mentioned in the introduction to this contribution, the 
adoption of such an alternative and subsequent development of the common law 
requires a justifiable theoretical framework. 
To establish such a framework, this contribution has examined the historical 
backgrounds of important statutory developments within the law of delict. This 
investigation has identified legal and public policy considerations that have justified 
the earlier instances of legislative reform. It is proposed that these considerations 
may also aid in providing the necessary theoretical framework on the basis of which 
the law of delict may justifiably be developed in the future, at least insofar as the 
issue of compensation is concerned. 
The first consideration that was highlighted was the role played by the increased 
risk of harm and the associated risk of no recovery of compensation. This 
consideration was paramount in developing the law of delict’s compensatory response 
to victims of motor vehicle accidents, defective consumer products and occupational 
injuries and diseases. Although there is an undeniable utility associated with motor 
vehicle transportation, enlarged labour forces and a growing manufacturing sector, 
these benefits were accompanied by a substantial increase in the risk of harm arising 
from those sectors. This required the South African legislature to produce   a solution 
in which these activities were permitted, but only on the condition that the most 
appropriate enterprise was saddled with the cost of the risks it produced. Ultimately, 
it decided that, in order to more effectively secure the compensation of a victim’s 
harm, the compensatory mechanism would have to be reconfigured within a statutory 
context. 
The decision to do so was informed also by the significant desire to promote 
social security. Prior to the advent of the Constitution, the achievement of greater 
social security was already identified as a clearly pronounced goal that justified   the 
statutory interference with the common law of delict. The legislature’s desire  to 
provide a variety of accident victims with remedies that gave quicker and more cost-
effective access to compensation and to distribute the risk of certain risk-related 
activities throughout society may therefore be regarded as an important consideration 
that have justified the development of the law of delict in a variety of contexts. 
With the enactment of the Constitution, and the entrenchment of the right to 
social security as a fundamental human right, the legislature has openly committed 
itself towards the notion of spreading risk to promote social inclusion and social 
solidarity. The statutory establishment of compensation funds in respect of motor 
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which most individuals are most frequently exposed to the risk of harm – achieves 
these goals. 
Furthermore, the evidentiary difficulties involved in satisfying the common-law 
requirement of fault, specifically in the form of negligence, has been criticised as 
imposing a significant stumbling block on the pathway to obtaining compensation. 
Otherwise deserving victims of harm have been struggling to satisfy this requirement 
and, where the matter has been argued in court, a clear preference has been given for 
the reform to be driven by a legislative process. Statutory reform provides       an 
advantage that single instances of litigation do not: it enables all the relevant stake-
holders to partake in the thorough processes of investigation, analysis and 
determination that are required to produce a cohesive and effective structure for the 
development of the law of delict. 
By removing fault  as  a  requirement  for  obtaining  compensation,  victims  of 
workplace injuries and diseases and defective consumers now have a greater 
theoretical chance in succeeding with finding redress for the harm they have suffered. 
Similarly, as indicated above, the proposed RABS will provide comparable 
opportunities. In addition to achieving greater compensation levels than the fault- 
based system of delictual liability, the statutory development of the law of delict have 
clearly been informed by considerations of time and money. 
Other general considerations that have been used to justify the statutory 
development of the law of delict has also been considered justified where it has 
enabled a more time-efficient and cost-effective route to compensation and where it 
has succeeded in providing a principled, consistent approach to compensation. 
It is proposed that the legal and public policy considerations identified in this 
contribution aid in providing a justifiable theoretical framework for the statutory 
development of the law of delict insofar as compensation of victims is generally 
concerned. However, by itself it does not yet justify why crime victims should be 
singled out as a specific category of victims that may come into consideration for 
statutory compensation (as opposed to any other category of victim). Indeed, as 
alluded to in the introduction of this contribution, where statutory compensation 
funds for crime victims have been enacted, some concern has been expressed about 
the singling out of this specific group of victims for preferential treatment. 
Attention must now be given to the question whether the specific development 
of the law of delict through the enactment of a statutory compensation fund for crime 
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